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ARTICLES 
 
The Legislative Response to Mass 
Police Surveillance 
Stephen Rushin† 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last two decades, police departments have 
dramatically expanded the use of advanced surveillance 
technologies. In 1997, around 20% of American police 
departments reported using some type of technological 
surveillance.1 By 2007, that number had risen to over 70%.2 
And no longer do police rely exclusively on basic surveillance 
technologies. The increasingly efficient and technologically 
advanced law enforcement of the twenty-first century utilizes a 
wide range of surveillance devices including automatic license 
plate readers (ALPR),3 surveillance cameras,4 red light cameras,5 
speed cameras,6 and biometric technology like facial recognition.7 
 
 † Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. I owe a 
debt of gratitude to the participants in the “Privacy, Surveillance Technologies, and the 
Fourth Amendment” panel at the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting for 
their thoughtful feedback. 
 1 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, LAW 
ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS (LEMAS): 1997 SAMPLE 
SURVEYS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (1997) [hereinafter LEMAS 1997], available 
at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/2700?q=1997+LEMAs (to access 
follow “Log In/Create Account” hyperlink; once registered, follow the “codebook.pdf” 
hyperlink on the LEMAS 1997 page) (defining surveillance as the percentage of total 
departments that report using some type of video cameras). 
 2 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, LAW 
ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS (LEMAS): 2007 SAMPLE 
SURVEYS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2007) [hereinafter LEMAS 2007], available 
at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/31161 (defining surveillance as 
the percentage of total departments that report using some type of video cameras). 
 3 See, e.g., Ryan Gallagher, Police Across U.S. Quietly Turning to Cameras 
That Track All Vehicles’ Movements: Survey, SLATE (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/future_tense/2013/01/14/automatic_license_plate_readers_survey_shows_most_u_
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I have previously called this radical shift in policing the 
beginning of the digitally efficient investigative state.8 By this, I 
mean that police today utilize technological replacements for 
traditional investigations that dramatically improve the 
efficiency of surveillance. These digitally efficient technologies 
do not give police any unique extrasensory ability.9 They merely 
improve the efficiency of public surveillance. Furthermore, these 
technologies only collect information on public movements and 
behaviors. They do not intrude on any constitutionally protected 
or private space.10 However, these tools have developed into a 
form of widespread community surveillance, which presents 
privacy concerns for many members of the community. 
In addressing public surveillance under the Fourth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court has previously operated under 
two important presumptions. I call these two general rules the 
jurisprudential assumptions of police surveillance. First, 
individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in any 
activities they make in public that may be visible to law 
enforcement. 11  So while officers need probable cause or a 
warrant to enter a home or automobile, they do not need any 
 
s_police_agencies_plan.html (noting recent surveys indicating that ALPR is spreading 
throughout American police departments). 
 4 See, e.g., City Looks at Outside Firm to Oversee Police Surveillance 
Cameras, ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT & CHRON., Jan. 4, 2013, (explaining how in cities like 
Rochester, the installation of over 200 surveillance cameras in the City now requires 
the hiring of a private company to monitor the cameras). 
 5 See, e.g., Larry Barszewski, Fort Lauderdale to Add More Red-Light 
Cameras, SUN SENTINEL (Jan. 23, 2013), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-01-23/
news/fl-brief-lauderdale-red-light-cameras-20130123_1_american-traffic-solutions-red-
light-cameras-intersection-approaches (noting that that cities like Fort Lauderdale are 
moving to install more red light cameras). 
 6 See, e.g., Erin Cox, State Highway Administration Defends Speed Camera 
Program, BALT. SUN (Jan. 15, 2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-15/news/
bs-md-speed-camera-briefing-20130115_1_camera-tickets-camera-law-camera-program 
(discussing Maryland’s significant investment in speed cameras across the state). 
 7 See, e.g., Eric Hartley, LAPD’s 16 San Fernando Valley Surveillance 
Cameras Go Live, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 16, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://www.dailynews.com/
general-news/20130117/lapds-16-san-fernando-valley-surveillance-cameras-go-live 
(mentioning that surveillance cameras used by the LAPD use facial recognition software 
technology that can identify a person from 600 feet away). 
 8 See Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 
2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 281 (2011). 
 9 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
 10 This distinction between public and private is important. See United 
States. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983) (noting that “[a] person traveling in an 
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements from one place to another”). 
 11 See, e.g., Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (determining that a person has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their public movements on roads or highways); 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (holding that a person has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the phone numbers they dial); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 360 (1967) (establishing standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
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authorization to investigate or record a person’s activities in 
public. Second, while technologies that give the state an 
extrasensory ability may violate an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy, technologies that merely improve the 
efficiency of otherwise permissible investigation techniques are 
presumptively permissible.12 Thus, while officers must obtain a 
warrant before using some extrasensory technologies, the Court 
generally does not regulate efficiency-enhancing technologies. 
These jurisprudential assumptions of police surveillance have 
been workable in the past because of the limited use and 
capability of efficiency-enhancing technologies.  
I have previously argued, however, that in the age of the 
digitally efficient investigative state, efficiency-enhancing 
technologies have become sufficiently intrusive as to demand a 
new doctrinal path.13 In United States v. Jones, the Supreme 
Court considered one such efficiency-enhancing surveillance 
technology—global positioning systems (GPS). 14  There, law 
enforcement officers installed a GPS device on a suspect’s car 
without a valid warrant.15 The government argued that the police 
did not need a warrant to install the GPS device because it was 
merely an efficient replacement for an otherwise legal police 
investigation tactic—public surveillance.16 But Antoine Jones 
claimed that he had a reasonable expectation that all of his 
movements over the course of a month would not be recorded in 
great detail by the state, even if they were executed in public.17 
The Jones case presented the perfect opportunity for the 
Court to amend one or both of the jurisprudential assumptions of 
police surveillance, but the Court punted the issue. The majority 
merely found that the installation of a GPS device violated the 
Fourth Amendment because of the device’s physical installation 
on the automobile.18 Post-Jones, many academics criticized the 
Court for not addressing the privacy issues raised by police 
surveillance technologies.19  I believe the Court will eventually 
regulate the digitally efficient investigative state in some manner. 
Indeed, dicta in the concurrences by Justices Sotomayor and Alito 
 
 12 Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the 
Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 433-39 (2007). 
 13 Rushin, supra note 8, at 282. 
 14 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 15 Id. at 948. 
 16 Id. at 949-50. 
 17 See id. 
 18 Id. at 953. 
 19 See, e.g., Lauren Millcarek, Comment, Eighteenth Century Law, Twenty-
First Century Problems: Jones, GPS Tracking, and the Future of Privacy, 64 FLA. L. 
REV. 1101 (2012). 
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suggest that the Court will be receptive to broader regulation of 
efficiency-enhancing surveillance technology in the near future.20 
Nevertheless, history dictates that any judicial regulation will be 
limited and likely rely on the often-ineffective exclusionary rule 
for enforcement.21 As a result, Congress and state legislators must 
play a significant role in any future regulation of police 
surveillance. Given that law enforcement in the United States is 
highly decentralized, 22  much of this regulation will have to 
come from state legislatures. 
In this article, I present a model statute that a state could 
enact to regulate the digitally efficient investigative state. This 
statute adheres to three major principles about the regulation of 
police surveillance. First, any regulation must provide clear 
standards that law enforcement can easily understand and 
apply.23  Second, as communities differ substantially in their 
need for public surveillance, any legislation must provide local 
municipalities with some ability to vary standards to meet 
their legitimate law enforcement needs. Third, any regulation 
must articulate the narrow scope of technologies and devices 
that fall under its regulatory purview. Because technology 
changes rapidly, this ensures that the law will not be 
misapplied to future, emerging technologies. 
The model statute I offer in this article honors these three 
important principles. The statute regulates the indiscriminate 
collection and retention of data by law enforcement surveillance 
technologies, while also permitting the use of technological 
surveillance for mere observational comparison. The statute 
 
 20 See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that 
“physical intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of surveillance. With increasing 
regularity, the Government will be capable of duplicating the monitoring undertaken 
in this case by enlisting factory- or owner-installed vehicle tracking devices or GPS-
enabled smartphones. In cases of electronic or other novel modes of surveillance that do 
not depend upon a physical invasion on property, the majority opinion’s trespassory 
test may provide little guidance” (citations omitted)). 
 21 See Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing 
Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 10 (2009) (noting that the exclusionary rule is “by far the 
most commonly used means of discouraging police misconduct,” which is ineffective 
because of its numerous exceptions and narrow scope). 
 22 See Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police 
Misconduct: A Model State “Pattern or Practice” Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 479, 
484 (2009) (noting that American law enforcement is “organizationally fragmented” 
meaning that “there is no single controlling authority that could presumably establish 
minimal standards for personnel, operations, and accountability procedures”). 
 23 Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward 
Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data That Congress 
Could Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 124 (2012) (noting the importance of clear 
and articulable rules for law enforcement); Charlie Savage, Judges Divided over Rising 
GPS Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2010, at A12 (Professor Orin Kerr arguing that 
police need clear rules). 
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establishes a maximum length of time for data retention. It also 
limits the sharing of personally identifiable information, and 
requires that law enforcement demonstrate a legitimate 
investigative purpose for identifying and accessing data. To 
enforce these broad regulations, the statute gives the state 
attorney general the authority to bring lawsuits against police 
departments that fail to abide by these regulations and 
excludes from criminal court any locational evidence obtained 
in violation of the statute. 
This statute would not address all of the concerns of the 
digitally efficient investigative state. After all, no statute can 
fully predict and control the development of new and emerging 
technologies. Nevertheless, it would be a major step toward 
coherency. This legislation would give a police department 
discretion to craft unique data policies tailored to its community’s 
specific needs, while also encouraging some level of statewide 
consistency. To date, only a small handful of law review articles 
have addressed the unique issues raised by digitally efficient 
community surveillance technology, such as automatic license 
plate readers (ALPR).24 Furthermore, none of this work has 
offered a comprehensive legislative response that could guide 
future regulation. Thus, this article fills a void in the available 
legal scholarship. 
I have divided this article into four parts. In Part I, I 
detail the growth and capabilities of the digitally efficient 
investigative state. I compile the most comprehensive set of 
data to date on the scope of digitally efficient investigative 
technologies in American police departments. I also present 
empirical evidence on the current state of internal departmental 
regulations. In Part II, I explore the law of police surveillance. In 
this Part, I further detail the jurisprudential assumptions about 
police surveillance that have guided the Court in the past. Post-
Jones, it appears that these jurisprudential assumptions may no 
longer be valid, drastically increasing the incoherence of police 
surveillance law. Part III offers a comprehensive legislative 
response intended to curb the potentially dangerous effects of 
 
 24 See, e.g., Jeremy Brown, Pan, Tilt, Zoom: Regulating the Use of Video 
Surveillance of Public Places, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 755 (2008); Olivia J. Greer, No 
Cause of Action: Video Surveillance in New York City, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. 
REV. 589 (2012); Linda M. Merola & Cynthia Lum, Emerging Surveillance Technologies: 
Privacy and the Case of License Plate Recognition (LPR) Technology, 96 JUDICATURE 119 
(2012); Jeffrey H. Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon: A Philosophical Exploration of the 
Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future, 11 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 27 (1995); Rushin, supra note 8; Tyson E. Hubbard, Note, 
Automatic License Plate Recognition: An Exciting New Law Enforcement Tool with 
Potentially Scary Consequences, 18 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 3 (2008). 
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mass police surveillance. I present and defend my proposed 
statutory regulation. Currently only a few states in the country 
regulate the use of any type of police surveillance technology.25 
I argue that this lack of regulation is increasingly indefensible. 
Both states and the judiciary must eventually take steps to 
comprehensively limit the use of digitally efficient community 
surveillance technologies. 
I. THE DIGITALLY EFFICIENT INVESTIGATIVE STATE 
Two years ago, I theorized on the emergence of a new type 
of policing that I called the digitally efficient investigative state.26 
This new type of policing relies on numerous technological 
surveillance methods that replace traditional policing tactics. 
Two classic examples of technologies used by the digitally 
efficient investigate state are video surveillance cameras with 
biometric recognition and automatic license plate readers 
(ALPR). I have argued that the advent of these new 
technologies demands a new type of regulatory response. In the 
first part of this section, I detail the characteristics of the 
digitally efficient investigative state. 
In the second part of this section, I summarize the most 
up-to-date empirical data on the expansion of the digitally 
efficient investigative state. Since I theorized on this emerging 
institution of social control two years ago, surveys by social 
science researchers have uncovered important new information 
about the growth and scope of the use of digitally efficient 
investigative technologies in American police departments. In 
this subsection, I also explore the current state of internal 
departmental regulations of mass surveillance technologies. The 
available evidence paints a pessimistic picture. Departments 
rarely self-regulate their collection of data or reveal their data 
retention policies. This failure to effectively self-regulate 
presents a cogent argument for legislative action. 
A. The Characteristics of the Digitally Efficient 
Investigative State 
I define the digitally efficient investigative state as a 
technologically advanced form of policing, reliant upon 
efficiency-enhancing surveillance of an entire community. The 
digitally efficient investigative state seeks not just to monitor 
 
 25 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. 29-A, § 2117-A (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 236:130 (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3800 (2010). 
 26 Rushin, supra note 8, at 284. 
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the activities of a single suspicious individual, but instead 
relies on widespread surveillance of the entire community. Two 
of the most common technologies used in the digitally efficient 
investigative state are ALPR and surveillance cameras with 
biometric recognition. Although most in the public are familiar 
with the capabilities of surveillance cameras, ALPR and 
biometric recognition are relatively new additions to the field of 
police surveillance. ALPR devices use “digital cameras mounted 
on a law enforcement vehicle or at stationary locations to snap 
images of passing license plates.”27 ALPR systems then convert 
these digital images of license plates into text files. 28  Once 
converted, ALPR systems can either “compare[ ]  the plate 
numbers to available databases, often called hotlists,” or they 
can store the data into searchable databases.29 Video surveillance 
cameras have long served as a replacement for traditional, in-
person police observation.30 But today these surveillance cameras 
are increasingly armed with biometric recognition, like facial 
recognition software, which “permit law enforcement to identify 
the individuals captured by surveillance cameras” based on 
their facial features.31 
Nine important characteristics define the digitally 
efficient investigative state. First, this policing technique only 
involves the collection of information on public behavior made 
visible to law enforcement. ALPR and surveillance cameras do 
not intrude into any private or protected space. This is different 
from other policing technologies like wiretaps or heat sensors. 
Wiretaps allow police to listen to conversations that were not 
publicly “broadcast to the world.”32 Heat sensors permit police to 
see “details of the home that would previously have been 
unknowable without physical intrusion.” 33  Digitally efficient 
surveillance technologies, conversely, merely record information 
about observable behavior made visible to the devices. ALPR 
chronicles license plates as vehicles pass stationary or mobile 
ALPR cameras, and surveillance cameras record video, and 
occasionally audio, of public actions. The public nature of 
digitally efficient surveillance is a primary reason that the 
judiciary has historically avoided regulating these technologies. 
 
 27 Id. at 285. 
 28 Id. 
 29 See id. at 285-86. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 288. 
 32 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). 
 33 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
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Second, the public information collected by these 
technologies is often personally identifiable. That is to say, once 
a digitally efficient surveillance device records an image of a 
license plate or a pedestrian, law enforcement can often 
identify the driver or pedestrian. Police using ALPR commonly 
cross-reference license plate numbers with state records of 
automobile owners to detect stolen cars or wanted criminals.34 
At least “[t]hirty-seven states currently load driver’s license 
photographs into state databases, which are searchable using 
facial recognition software.”35 In both cases, police are able to 
take data collected via these efficiency-enhancing technologies 
and connect it to a specific individual. 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) defines personally identifiable information as “any 
information that can be used to distinguish or trace an 
individual’s identity . . . and other information that is linked or 
linkable [to a specific person’s identity].”36 Classic examples of 
personally identifiable information would be a person’s name, 
address, and telephone number. 37  The NIST also considers 
biometric data, including photographic images and videos, vehicle 
identifiers, and property records, to be personally identifiable.38 
Under this broad definition, data recovered by digitally efficient 
technologies is undeniably personally identifiable information. 
Police can easily link a car’s license plate number to a specific 
owner. And police can often use biometric data from surveillance 
cameras—commonly facial recognition—to identify a pedestrian 
on the street. Thus, once digitally efficient surveillance 
technologies collect data, this data can be linked or connected 
with a specific person through cross-reference to other 
government databases. 
Third, these technologies involve not just narrow 
observation of a single suspect, but the broad surveillance of an 
entire community over an extended period of time. This is 
different than less expansive surveillance technologies 
 
 34 See CYNTHIA LUM ET AL., CTR. FOR EVIDENCE BASED CRIME POL’Y, GEORGE 
MASON UNIV., LICENSE PLATE RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY: IMPACT EVALUATION AND 
COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT 21 (2010), available at http://gemini.gmu.edu/cebcp/lpr_
final.pdf; Rushin, supra note 8, at 285-86. 
 35 Rushin, supra note 8, at 288 (citing Joey Bunch, Smiling Upon Grins: Colorado 
Allows Expressions That Other States Say Mess Up Driver’s License Software, DENVER 
POST, May 30, 2009, at B2, available at http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_12481772). 
 36 ERIKA MCCALLISTER ET AL., NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF PERSONALLY 
IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (PII) 2-1 (2010), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/
publications/nistpubs/800-122/sp800-122.pdf. 
 37 Id. at 2-2. 
 38 Id. 
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previously considered by the Court, like GPS. A single GPS 
device affixed to an automobile can give police detailed 
information on the movements of a single automobile for an 
extended period of time.39 A GPS device, however, is limited in 
scope. It only monitors and records the movements of a single 
criminal suspect at a time. This limits the broad community 
impact of GPS surveillance. Police have to identify an 
individual as a criminal suspect and then install the device to 
facilitate surveillance. By contrast, the technologies I describe 
as part of the digitally efficient investigative state broadly and 
indiscriminately monitor the public behavior of an entire 
community. Surveillance cameras record any and all behavior 
made public in front of their lenses. ALPR devices run the 
license plates of all automobiles that fall within the device’s 
view. Thus, every person in a community becomes a target of 
the digitally efficient investigative state, not just pre-identified 
criminal suspects. 
Fourth, because the digitally efficient investigative state 
monitors the entire community, it collects information on 
illegal activity as well as innocuous behavior. Some policing 
technologies, like red light and speed cameras, have been 
narrowly devised to only record images and collect data when a 
person violates a traffic law. The digitally efficient investigative 
state is different. Devices like ALPR and surveillance cameras 
are useful because they collect data on all passing cars and 
pedestrians. A single ALPR device or surveillance camera might 
replace the efforts of dozens, even hundreds, of individual law 
enforcement officers. ALPR, for example, is only useful because 
it is an unbelievably efficient replacement for a traditional 
policing technique—cross-referencing the license plates of 
passing cars with databases of active warrants and stolen 
automobiles. But when a device can cross-reference and record 
data on up to 1,800 license plates per minute,40 it will invariably 
gather enormous amounts of data on innocent people. 
Fifth, the technological tools used by the digitally 
efficient investigative state only improve the efficiency of 
otherwise permissible surveillance techniques. They do not 
offer officers any extrasensory ability. Many technological 
developments in policing have been met with suspicion because 
they give police a superhuman ability not typically associated 
 
 39 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012) (noting that law 
enforcement gathered data on Antoine Jones’s movements in his automobile for 28 
days straight). 
 40 Rushin, supra note 8, at 285. 
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with public policing. For example, in Kyllo, the Court barred 
the warrantless use of heat sensors that could allow police to see 
movements inside the walls of the home.41 ALPR, surveillance 
cameras, and facial recognition arguably all complete tasks that 
an individual officer could complete without technological 
assistance. They just do so with astonishing efficiency. 
Sixth, these technologies give officers two distinct 
capabilities: observational comparison and indiscriminate data 
collection. Observational comparison refers to the limited and 
temporary collection of data by a digitally efficient technology 
for comparison and cross-reference to relevant databases. For 
example, “[w]hen used for observation comparison, ALPR only 
retains data on license plates that match known or suspected 
criminal hotlists.”42 In the case of surveillance cameras armed 
with facial recognition, “the collection of data would be limited 
to individuals whose appearance so closely resembles a known 
criminal as to create reasonable, individualized suspicion.”43 By 
contrast, indiscriminate data collection refers to data retention 
practices whereby police indefinitely retain all information 
collected by digitally efficient technologies, regardless of 
whether the data is linked to any criminal investigation. 
Seventh, advances in data storage capabilities have 
facilitated and incentivized the use of these technologies for 
indiscriminate data collection. Traditionally, one of the greatest 
limitations on long-term government surveillance was the 
limited data retention capabilities of the state.44 But as the cost 
of data storage decreases, and the technological feasibility of 
such storage improves,45 the government has no disincentive to 
collect as much data as possible on public behavior—so long as 
this information might be useful to a state.46 In the case of law 
enforcement, information may seem irrelevant at the time of 
collection, but may end up being extremely valuable in solving 
future crimes. 47  Indeed, as I discuss in Part I.C, the only 
empirical evidence suggests that the overwhelming majority of 
 
 41 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
 42 Rushin, supra note 8, at 285. 
 43 Id. at 288. 
 44 See Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 1, 14 (2008). 
 45 See Patricia L. Bellia, The Memory Gap in Surveillance Law, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 137, 140-42 (2008). 
 46 See Rushin, supra note 8, at 291. 
 47 Id. at 286 (describing the hypothetical situation where a child is abducted, 
and police can immediately turn to surveillance data from the time and location of the 
suspected abduction). 
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departments with digitally efficient surveillance technology, 
like ALPR, use it for indiscriminate data collection.48 
Eighth, indiscriminate data collection allows law 
enforcement to aggregate large amounts of information about a 
single individual, thereby revealing personal information about 
habits and behaviors. Five of the justices in Jones noted in two 
separate concurrences that the accumulation of large amounts of 
data on public movements transforms normal surveillance into a 
potentially unconstitutional invasion of individual privacy. 49 
These extensive records on individual movements might reveal 
private interests, patterns of behavior, or habits. For example, 
aggregation of surveillance data of an individual might enable 
“the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political 
and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”50 Police and the 
state can use this type of revealing personal information to 
target unpopular minorities or conduct fishing expeditions.51 
Ninth, departments commonly share this personally 
identifiable information. Police have organized both nationally 
and regionally to share personally identifiable surveillance 
data.52 As I explain further in Part I.C, the limited empirical 
data suggest that departments currently share data collected 
through digitally efficient surveillance technologies. 53  The 
sharing of this data is understandable and potentially useful. 
Criminals, like most individuals, often move in and out of 
different police jurisdictions. Information sharing allows police 
to efficiently identify not just criminals and stolen property 
from their jurisdiction, but also those from jurisdictions across 
the country. In a country like the United States with an 
extremely decentralized array of policing agencies, this type of 
data sharing can facilitate cooperation and dramatically 
increase the likelihood of apprehending criminals and recovering 
stolen property. For example, Cincinnati is currently building a 
regional data-sharing network for ALPR data for departments 
across Southwest Ohio, Southeast Indiana and Northern 
Kentucky, called SOSINK. The purpose of this regional 
network is to both apprehend wanted subjects traveling across 
this regional territory and collect intelligence relevant to 
 
 48 See infra Part I.C. 
 49 See generally United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955-64 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring & Alito, J., concurring). 
 50 Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 51 See Rushin, supra note 8, at 299. 
 52 Id. at 292. 
 53 See infra Part I.C. 
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ongoing investigations in departments throughout the area.54 
Maryland law enforcement has developed a similar data-
sharing network. 55  The state hopes to eventually have 32 
agencies sharing information.56 
This type of regional data sharing of surveillance data is 
relatively common; one study found that 43% of surveyed 
departments share data as part of a regional system.57 But this 
type of sharing is also potentially problematic. Such sharing of 
personally identifiable data may increase the possibility of 
“secondary use.”58 As Daniel Solove explains, “[t]he potential for 
secondary use generates fear and uncertainty over how one’s 
information will be used in the future, creating a sense of 
powerlessness and vulnerability.”59 
The expansion of the digitally efficient investigative 
state is one of the most important developments in the history 
of policing. Digitally efficient surveillance technologies expand 
the reach of American police departments. Emerging evidence 
over the last two decades suggests that police presence may 
actually reduce crime by altering situational incentives.60 One 
possible way to lower the overall crime rate of a community, 
then, is to increase the number of law enforcement officers.61 
But local communities must operate on finite budgets, limiting 
the number of police officers they can hire. Thus, criminologists 
and policing scholars have found that departments can most 
effectively reduce crime by allocating more of their staff to high 
 
 54 See Russell A. Neville, Cincinnati Regional Automatic License Plate 
Recognition Technology Project, POLICE CHIEF MAG. (June 2009), available at 
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_
id=1823&issue_id=62009. 
 55 See Press Release, Office of Governor Martin O’Malley, Governor Martin 
O’Malley Announces Enhanced Fight Against Auto Theft (Aug. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.governor.maryland.gov/pressreleases/100804.asp. 
 56 DAVID J. ROBERTS & MEGHANN CASANOVA, INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF 
POLICE, AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE RECOGNITION SYSTEMS: POLICY AND OPERATIONAL 
GUIDANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 24 (2012). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 477, 521 (2006). 
 59 Id. at 522. 
 60 See generally Ronald V. G. Clarke, ‘Situational’ Crime Prevention: Theory 
and Practice, 20 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 136 (1980) (describing situational crime 
prevention theory and how supervision of any variety, including police, can affect an 
individual’s propensity for criminal behavior); Lawrence W. Sherman & David 
Weisburd, General Deterrent Effects of Police Patrol in Crime “Hot Spots”: A 
Randomized, Controlled Trial, 12 JUST. Q. 625 (1995). 
 61 See generally Steven D. Levitt, Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to 
Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime, 87 AMER. ECON. REV. 270 (1997); AARON 
CHALFIN & JUSTIN MCCRARY, U. C. BERKELEY, THE EFFECT OF POLICE ON CRIME: NEW 
EVIDENCE FROM U.S. CITIES, 1960–2010 (2012). 
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crime neighborhoods, or hot spots.62 A strong body of empirical 
case studies shows that such hot spot policing can reduce, and 
not merely displace, crime.63 
All of these theories of crime reduction rely upon a 
principal assumption: police cannot be everywhere at once. Thus, 
scholars in this field try to find methods to improve the efficiency 
of police activity. The digitally efficient investigative state 
radically shifts this fundamental assumption of policing and 
crime control theory. Early quantitative studies on the effects of 
digitally efficient technologies have returned mixed results on its 
crime fighting abilities.64 But if these technologies do become tools 
for deterrence, investigation, and criminal apprehension, their 
crime fighting ability will be virtually unmatched by any other 
technological development in recent history. 
Legal scholars and policymakers should look at this 
trend in policing innovation as a potential tool for both crime 
control and a source of potential widespread privacy violations. 
A growing body of evidence confirms that law enforcement uses 
these surveillance technologies to target minority groups. 65 
Psychological and historical evidence suggests that the 
availability of pervasive surveillance tools may facilitate law 
enforcement corruption. 66  With the unregulated ability to 
monitor an entire community, law enforcement may be 
incentivized to conduct fishing expeditions that “exacerbate 
racism, stereotyping, or profiling.”67  This elevates the risk of 
false positives and harms citizens’ perceptions of procedural 
fairness.68 Thus, while the digitally efficient investigative state 
may be an important development for crime prevention, it also 
raises numerous privacy concerns. 
 
 62 See generally David Weisburd & Anthony A. Braga, Hot Spots Policing as a 
Model for Police Innovation, in POLICE INNOVATION 225 (2006). 
 63 See, e.g., Anthony A. Braga, Hot Spots Policing and Crime Prevention: A 
Systematic Review of Randomized Controlled Trials, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 
317 (2005) (finding that the majority of empirical studies support the effectiveness of 
hot spot policing). 
 64 Compare Jennifer King et al., Fighting Crime with Publicly-Financed 
Surveillance Cameras: The San Francisco Experience, CAL. POL’Y OPTIONS 2009 145, 158 
(2009), available at http://www.spa.ucla.edu/webfiles/doc/116679final.pdf (explaining how 
the installation of 19 surveillance cameras in San Francisco correlated with a subsequent 
reduction in crime), with LUM ET AL., supra note 34, at 27-59 (finding that ALPR devices 
had no significant effect on crime in a single case study). 
 65 See Rushin, supra note 8, at 299. 
 66 Id. at 300-01. 
 67 Id. at 300. 
 68 See id. at 301-02. 
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B. Empirical Evidence on the Scope of Surveillance 
Technologies 
Despite the importance of the digitally efficient 
investigative state, no comprehensive research has fully 
documented the extent to which police departments across the 
country have adopted these new surveillance technologies. To 
better illustrate the magnitude of the digitally efficient 
investigative state, I have gathered survey data from four 
sources: (1) the Law Enforcement Management and 
Administration Statistics (LEMAS), (2) the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), (3) the Police Executive 
Research Forum (PERF), and (4) independent surveys conducted 
by academics researching police organizations. 
The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) publishes the 
LEMAS data every three to four years as part of a 
comprehensive survey of approximately 3,000 state and local 
law enforcement agencies. 69  Because the BJS conducts the 
LEMAS survey semi-regularly, this data set is useful for 
observing changes over time in police behavior. But the BJS 
survey data only gives information on the current use of various 
surveillance technologies. So far, the BJS has not collected data 
on departmental policies on surveillance data retention. 
The data from the IACP and PERF comes from a 
handful of one-time surveys. Fewer departments respond to 
IACP and PERF surveys than BJS requests. Nonetheless, the 
IACP and PERF studies often include detailed questions on 
departments’ data retention, usage, and access policies—
something the LEMAS study lacks. The IACP and PERF 
surveys also have included information on future plans for the 
technology and law enforcement departments’ participation in 
regional data sharing. 
1. Surveillance Cameras and Biometric Recognition 
Surveillance cameras are nearly ubiquitous in American 
police departments. According to the 1997 LEMAS survey, nearly 
700—or approximately 20% of all departments responding to the 
question—reported using some type of surveillance cameras.70 In 
the following decade, the percentage of departments increased 
 
 69 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DATA COLLECTION: 
LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS, available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=248 (last visited Aug. 28, 2013). 
 70 LEMAS 1997, supra note 1. 
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dramatically to 56% in 2000, 67% in 2003, and 71% in 2007.71 
Between 1997 and 2007, the number of departments using 
surveillance cameras increased by 189%. The IACP study 
similarly found that departments regularly employed 
surveillance cameras. In a 2001 survey of 207 police agencies, 
around 80% claimed to use some type of surveillance camera.72 
Although the IACP survey found that a higher number of 
departments used surveillance cameras around the turn of the 
century than the LEMAS survey, this discrepancy can be traced 
to the demographic profiles of the departments responding to 
each survey instrument. 73  It is safe to say that, while 
surveillance cameras were relatively rare two decades ago, they 
are extremely common today. Figure 1 shows the historical 
trend in police use of surveillance cameras over time. 
 
FIGURE 1, PERCENTAGE OF POLICE DEPARTMENTS USING 
ANY CAMERA SURVEILLANCE74 
 
 
 71 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, LAW 
ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS (LEMAS): 2000 SAMPLE 
SURVEYS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2000) [hereinafter LEMAS 2000], available 
at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/series/92/studies/3565; U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS (LEMAS): 2003 SAMPLE SURVEYS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCIES (2003) [hereinafter LEMAS 2003], available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/
icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/04411; LEMAS 2007, supra note 2. 
 72 LAURA J. NICHOLS, INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, CUTTING EDGE OF 
TECHNOLOGY EXECUTIVE BRIEF: THE USE OF CCTV/VIDEO CAMERAS IN LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 4, 15 (2001). 
 73 See id. at 14 (explaining the breakdown of the survey pool—including the 
relative amount of larger departments surveyed). 
 74 LEMAS 2007, supra note 2; LEMAS 2003, supra note 71; LEMAS 2000, 
supra note 71; LEMAS 1997, supra note 1. In calculating the data for Figure 1, I group 
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The actual number of surveillance cameras used by 
individual departments also varies widely from one department 
to the next. But overall, the number of cameras employed by 
the average American police department has increased steadily 
over the last decade. The LEMAS survey first kept records on 
the number of surveillance cameras used by departments in 
2000, when the average department reported employing around 
10 surveillance cameras.75 The police in the United States in 
2000 operated just under 30,000 total cameras.76 By 2007, the 
average department utilized nearly 27 cameras, or a total of 
nearly 77,000 nationwide.77 This represents a 161% increase in 
total cameras and a 170% increase in cameras per department 
over a mere seven-year period. Figure 2 graphically illustrates 
the trend in the average number of surveillance cameras per 
department over a 10 year period. 
 
FIGURE 2, AVERAGE NUMBER OF SURVEILLANCE 
CAMERAS PER DEPARTMENT78 
 
The LEMAS data may also dramatically underestimate 
the actual number of surveillance cameras used by police in the 
United States. Many cities, like Chicago, give police access to 
an integrated network of surveillance cameras—public transit 
cameras, police cameras, and school cameras. Estimates range 
 
together in this calculation three categories of surveillance cameras: fixed cameras, 
mobile cameras, and cameras mounted on squad cars. 
 75 LEMAS 2000, supra note 71. 
 76 Id. 
 77 LEMAS 2007, supra note 2. 
 78 Id.; LEMAS 2003, supra note 71; LEMAS 2000, supra note 71. 
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from 8,00079 cameras to 15,00080 cameras. When responding to 
the LEMAS survey, Chicago reported use of only 1,073 cameras 
in 2007.81 In all likelihood, this number only represents the 
number of cameras installed and operated exclusively by 
police—not the number of cameras used by the city and 
monitored in some manner by law enforcement. Thus, the 
LEMAS conclusions almost certainly underestimate the actual 
number of cameras that police access regularly. 
In other IACP surveys, police departments have also 
rated surveillance cameras as among the highest priority 
targets for continued technological investment. A 2005 study of 
47 law enforcement departments asked administrators to rate the 
relative importance of future investments in different 
investigative technologies.82 Video cameras were among the top 
five most important sources for future technological investment.83 
Overall, biometric recognition systems, like facial 
recognition, seem to be rarely used by the average police 
department. In the LEMAS survey, only 191 departments 
claimed to use the technology in 2003 and 98 in 2007.84 But 
according to the IACP study, departments indicated a significant 
interest in investing in facial recognition technology in the 
future. 85  In addition, the majority of law enforcement 
administrators believe facial recognition will be of high value to 
departments in the future.86 
2. Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPR) 
There is less historical data on the adoption of ALPR 
devices. The LEMAS surveys only recently started asking 
departments about their use of ALPR. The 2007 LEMAS 
survey was the first. Only 170 departments or about 19% of 
those agencies that responded to the survey question claimed 
 
 79 NANCY G. LA VINGE ET AL., URBAN INST., EVALUATING THE USE OF PUBLIC 
SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS FOR CRIME CONTROL AND PREVENTION—A SUMMARY 2 (2011). 
 80 Police Exec. Research Forum, How Are Innovations in Technology Transforming 
Policing?, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING SERIES 13 (2012) [hereinafter PERF]. 
 81 LEMAS 2007, supra note 2. 
 82 INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES FOR 
PUBLIC SAFETY: IDENTIFYING CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY NEEDS 2-3 (2005) [hereinafter 
IACP CRITICAL TECH. NEEDS]. 
 83 Id. at 3. 
 84 LEMAS 2003, supra note 71; LEMAS 2007, supra note 2. It is unclear why 
exactly the number of departments that use biometric technology has not increased 
like other technologies. 
 85 IACP CRITICAL TECH. NEEDS, supra note 82, at 7 (noting that among the 
categories of video cameras and biometric technologies, respondents placed fixed 
surveillance cameras and facial recognition at the top of their relative priority lists). 
 86 See NICHOLS, supra note 72, at 13. 
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to use ALPR in some capacity.87 While this initially suggests 
that ALPR is relatively uncommon in the United States, the 
breakdown of ALPR by city reveals that large cities commonly 
employ ALPR. Approximately 48% of departments with over 
1,000 sworn officers utilize ALPR, compared to 32% of 
departments with between 501 and 1,000 officers, and 19% of 
those with between 251 and 500 sworn employees.88 California, 
New York, and Florida had the most agencies that claim to use 
ALPR, with Texas, Virginia, Colorado, and Georgia not far 
behind.89 
Since the LEMAS data came out, three other surveys 
have attempted to document the use of ALPR in American 
police agencies. The IACP published the first of these post-
LEMAS studies in 2009 after surveying 444 law enforcement 
departments in the United States. Of the 305 that responded, 
23% reported using ALPR.90 Like LEMAS, the IACP designed 
the survey to carefully consider the effect of police organization 
size on ALPR adoption. Table 1 breaks down ALPR usage by 
department size. 
 
TABLE 1, 2007 LEMAS AND 2009 IACP REPORTED ALPR 
USAGE BY DEPARTMENT SIZE91 
 
 
The sample size of those responding to the IACP survey 
was smaller than the LEMAS survey, which might partially 
explain the variation. Nonetheless, the IACP numbers build a 
compelling case that the usage of ALPR is increasing. In a 
more recent study, Cynthia Lum, Linda Merola, Julie Willis, 
 
 87 ROBERTS & CASANOVA, supra note 56, at 6; LEMAS 2007, supra note 2. 
 88 ROBERTS & CASANOVA, supra note 56, at 6. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 19. 
 91 ROBERTS & CASANOVA, supra note 56; LEMAS 2007, supra note 2. 
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and Breanne Cave surveyed a random but statistically 
representative sample of 200 police departments.92 Of the 169 
departments that responded, Lum et al. found that 21% used 
ALPR.93 Among larger departments of 100 sworn officers or 
more, the number increased to 37%.94 This generally comports 
with the IACP and LEMAS findings. Like the IACP report, 
Lum et al.’s study finds convincing evidence that ALPR usage 
has increased since the 2007 LEMAS report, and that ALPR 
usage depends in large part on department size. 
The most recent research on the subject comes from a 
2011 survey conducted by PERF. They found that 71% of 
responding agencies currently use ALPR and 85% of 
administrators plan to acquire more ALPR devices or increase 
use in the future.95 Again, it is worth noting that the sample 
size in the PERF survey was only 70 agencies—not quite as 
large as the Lum et al. study and significantly smaller than 
LEMAS. 96  The distribution of the PERF sample also skews 
heavily toward large departments.97 This possibly affects the 
overall findings, and results in a disproportionately large 
percentage of departments that report ALPR usage compared 
to the other surveys. But even when accounting for the 
somewhat skewed sample, the results are strong evidence that 
departments have increased ALPR adoption in recent years. 
Respondents to the PERF survey instrument also noted that 
they expected to equip 25% of all squad cars in their 
department with ALPR devices in the next five years.98 
The LEMAS and PERF reports do not provide detailed 
information on the exact number of ALPR systems deployed 
per department, but media reports have uncovered detailed 
information about the heavy distribution of ALPR devices in 
some of America’s largest cities. The District of Columbia and 
surrounding suburbs currently operate over 250 ALPR devices.99 
 
 92 LUM ET AL., supra note 34, at 13-14. 
 93 Id. at 19. 
 94 Id. at 18-19. 
 95 PERF, supra note 80, at 1-2. 
 96 POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, USE OF TECHNOLOGY IN POLICING: 
THE CHIEF’S PERSPECTIVE 9 (2011) [hereinafter PERF CHIEF’S PERSPECTIVE], available 
at http://www.policeforum.org/library/critical-issues-in-policing-series/perfpresentation.pdf. 
 97 Id. at 3. Further, the median size of the department using ALPR in the 
PERF study was 336 sworn officers. ROBERTS & CASANOVA, supra note 56, at 7. Thus, 
the PERF sample size appears to be skewed toward large departments. 
 98 PERF CHIEF’S PERSPECTIVE, supra note 96, at 9. 
 99 Allison Klein & Josh White, License Plate Readers: A Useful Tool for Police 
Comes with Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/license-plate-readers-a-useful-tool-for-police-
comes-with-privacy-concerns/2011/11/18/gIQAuEApcN_story.html. 
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The state of Maryland has installed around 300 devices 
statewide.100 New York City had installed 238 by 2011.101 Dallas 
plans to use somewhere between 48 to 68 systems in the near 
future.102 This rapid proliferation was predictable. As early as 
2005, a survey of law enforcement conducted by the IACP found 
that police administrators rated ALPR as the highest priority 
locational and global position technology for future 
investment.103 Overall, the body of evidence on ALPR suggests 
that the technology is becoming common in American law 
enforcement agencies. 
In sum, the data from these various sources generally 
reveal two major trends about the adoption of digitally efficient 
surveillance technology. First, digitally efficient surveillance 
technologies are becoming ubiquitous among American police 
departments—particularly in large, urban departments. Second, 
this rapid transformation in policing technology has happened in 
a relatively short period of time. This should come as no 
surprise. Given the potential criminological and cost benefits of 
digitally efficient surveillance technologies, departments should 
be investing in these types of technologies. The next logical 
question is whether and how departments have internally 
regulated these technologies after adoption. The next section 
will summarize the limited empirical work on the state of 
internal departmental regulations. 
C. The State of Internal Departmental Regulations 
The empirical evidence on the scope of the digitally 
efficient investigative state paints a clear and persuasive 
picture—digitally efficient technologies are becoming increasingly 
common, particularly in large police departments. This means 
that departments are often collecting enormous amounts of data 
on a daily basis. Police agencies in Southern California, for 
instance, have amassed over 160 million data points from the 
use of ALPR alone.104 Fundamental to the emergence of the 
digitally efficient investigative state is the ability to retain 
 
 100 ROBERTS & CASANOVA, supra note 56, at 28. 
 101 Al Baker, Camera Scans of Car Plates Are Reshaping Police Inquiries, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2011, at A17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/nyregion/
12plates.html. 
 102 CITY OF DALL., TEX., REQUEST FOR COMPETITIVE SEALED PROPOSAL: DPD 
MOBILE AND FIXED AUTOMATIC LICENSE PLATE RECOGNITION (ALPR) SYSTEM 2-4 
(2012); ROBERTS & CASANOVA, supra note 56, at 28. 
 103 IACP CRITICAL TECH. NEEDS, supra note 82, at 7. 
 104 Jon Campbell, License Plate Recognition Logs Our Lives Long Before We 
Sin, L.A. WEEKLY (June 21, 2012), http://www.laweekly.com/2012-06-21/news/license-
plate-recognition-tracks-los-angeles/. 
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large amounts of data due to improving technological feasibility 
and decreased cost. 105  This means that law enforcement 
agencies collect data on all recorded activity, not just 
suspicious or criminal behavior. 
Departments have every incentive to keep as much data 
as possible, if that data could be useful in any way to a future 
criminal investigation. But the possibility of unregulated data 
retention on innocent people raises serious privacy concerns.106 
Without regulation, historical and psychological evidence 
indicates that unregulated surveillance data retention may 
allow the state to target unpopular minority groups for 
unjustified surveillance, increase the likelihood of corruption, 
and facilitate fishing expeditions that could eventually disrupt 
the lives of the innocent.107 
New evidence suggests that departments have 
implemented vastly different internal regulations on the use, 
retention, and access to data acquired from digitally efficient 
technologies. The overwhelming majority of departments use 
these technologies not just for observational comparison, but 
also indiscriminate data collection. Some departments keep 
data for a matter of days, while others retain it indefinitely. 
The BJS does not ask departments about data retention 
policies in the LEMAS surveys. Thus, the best information on 
data retention by American law enforcement comes from the 
pair of studies done on ALPR and surveillance cameras by the 
IACP in 2001 and 2009 respectively. According to these reports, 
96% of departments using surveillance cameras, and 95% of 
those using ALPR engage in some kind of indiscriminate data 
collection—not just observational comparison.108 
Among departments that take part in the practice of 
indiscriminate data collection, the length of retention varies 
widely. Among departments using surveillance cameras, the 
vast majority retain video footage for over a month. 109  Of 
course, the IACP completed this survey on surveillance 
cameras over a decade ago, when long-term data storage was 
less feasible. We may expect that today, departments can 
affordably store video footage for even longer periods of time. 
 
 105 See supra Part I.A. 
 106 See Rushin, supra note 8, at 299-302. 
 107 Id. 
 108 NICHOLS, supra note 72, at 9 (defining observational comparison as the 
presence of a formalized policy permitting no storage of data, according to figure 10); 
ROBERTS & CASANOVA, supra note 56, at 29 (defining observational comparison as the 
presence of a formalized policing permitting no storage of data, according to table 18). 
 109 NICHOLS, supra note 72, at 9. 
22 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1 
Table 2 summarizes the IACP data on surveillance camera 
data retention. 
 
TABLE 2, 2001 IACP DATA ON SURVEILLANCE CAMERA 
DATA RETENTION 
 
 
The IACP also found that a significant number of 
departments outsourced the operation of police surveillance 
cameras, as well as the storage and maintenance of data. 
Around 47% of all camera operators were found to be sworn 
police officers.110 Furthermore, while surveillance camera data is 
generally stored at police facilities, the responsibility for 
maintenance, collection, and disposal of data falls to non-police 
officers in 43% of departments.111 
As for ALPR locational data, the typical department 
retained data for between two and six months.112 But a very 
substantial portion of police departments—around 28%—admit 
to having either no policy limiting data retention, or having a 
departmental policy that mandates indefinite retention. 113 
Table 3 aggregates the IACP findings on ALPR data retention. 
 
 
 110 Id. at 8 (noting in figure 7 that only 53% of operators are police officers). 
 111 Id. (noting in figure 6 that only 57% of the departments have police manage 
data, but noting in figure 9 that in 90% of agencies the data is stored at police facilities). 
 112 ROBERTS & CASANOVA, supra note 56, at 29. I define the typical 
department as the median department responding to the survey. Although the data is 
not broken down by case, we can surmise from table 18 that the median is somewhere 
between two and six months. 
 113 Id. 
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TABLE 3, 2009 IACP DATA ON ALPR DATA RETENTION 
 
 
Civil rights advocates have also attempted to gather 
more up-to-date information on data retention policies by filing 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests with departments 
all across the country. The ACLU has led this charge by filing 
587 requests in 38 states.114 So far, the ACLU has received 
responses from 293 departments.115 Although the ACLU has 
not yet released the full extent of their data, they have 
observed that retention policies vary widely from one 
jurisdiction to the next.116 Departments commonly keep data for 
several years, with many departments keeping retained data 
indefinitely when possible.117 
While some departments have proactively established 
internal policies to regulate the use of these technologies, many 
have not. Further, internal policies on data access, retention, and 
sharing differ dramatically from one department to the next. 
 
 114 Am. Civil Liberties Union, You Are Being Tracked: How License Plate 
Readers are Being Used to Record Americans’ Movements (July 17, 2013), 
https://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/you-are-being-tracked-how-license-plate-
readers-are-being-used-record. 
 115 Id. at 3. 
 116 Id. at 20. 
 117 Id. 
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II. THE LAW OF POLICE SURVEILLANCE 
Traditionally, courts have shied away from regulating 
police surveillance in public spaces. This is because the courts 
have operated under a set of jurisprudential assumptions of 
police surveillance. These jurisprudential assumptions were 
reasonable in the past because of the limited technological 
efficiency of previous surveillance technologies. In Jones, the 
Supreme Court had the opportunity to confront these 
jurisprudential assumptions in light of modern technology. A 
majority of the justices indicated that these jurisprudential 
assumptions were increasingly unsupportable in today’s 
digitally efficient world of policing.118 But the Court did not 
alter these doctrinal assumptions in any way, nor did they offer 
much indication on how they may alter these assumptions in 
the future. Thus, after the Jones decision, the law of police 
surveillance today is as incoherent as ever. 
I have previously argued that the digitally efficient 
investigative state does not run afoul of the Fourth 
Amendment, based on the presence of these jurisprudential 
assumptions,119 but dicta in the concurrences of the Jones case 
imply that these jurisprudential assumptions may not exist for 
much longer. Even so, there is no clear indication how the 
Court could establish a default rule that both narrowly limits 
some uses of digitally efficient technologies without adversely 
affecting other non-invasive, legitimate uses. 
In this section, I evaluate the doctrinal basis for the 
traditional jurisprudential assumptions about police 
surveillance. I then spend considerable time analyzing the 
dicta in the Jones case to predict how the Court may respond to 
these technologies in the future. I conclude that, while the 
Court will likely make some effort to rein in the digitally 
efficient investigative state in the future, any regulation will be 
limited in capacity. The regulation will almost certainly rely upon 
an often-ineffective enforcement tool like the exclusionary rule. 
Thus, even if the judiciary is institutionally capable of controlling 
the digitally efficient investigative state, the legislature must also 
take a proactive role in any future regulation. 
 
 118 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955-64 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring and Alito, J., concurring) (both concurrences finding support for a broad 
doctrinal shift in the treatment of technological surveillance). 
 119 Rushin, supra note 8, at 309-13. 
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A. The Fourth Amendment and Privacy 
Almost all legal challenges to surveillance, including the 
challenge levied in Jones, claim that government surveillance 
amounts to an unreasonable search or seizure in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The 
Fourth Amendment does not bar all searches; instead it merely 
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures by 
government agents.120 In judging whether a tactic qualifies as 
an unreasonable search or seizure, the Court generally uses a 
test originally developed in Justice Harlan’s concurrence in 
Katz v. United States. 121  This test asks whether the action 
violates a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.122 An act 
violates a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy if the 
person “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,” 
and such an expectation of privacy is “one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”123 
The Court grappled with the jurisprudence of police 
surveillance for many decades before adopting the Katz 
standard. In a 1928 case, Olmstead v. United States, federal 
prohibition officers used an early version of a wiretap to listen 
in on the conversation of a criminal suspect.124 The officers did 
not obtain a warrant before using the device. 125  Using this 
technology, law enforcement listened to the suspect’s 
conversations for many months. 126  They then used the 
conversations as evidence to justify an arrest and later 
conviction. 127  The Court upheld this wireless wiretapping as 
constitutional, arguing that the practice involved no physical 
intrusion into the person’s home or seizure of tangible property.128 
The Court compared phone lines to public highways, noting 
that the phone lines “are not part of his house or office any 
more than are the highways along which they are stretched.”129 
Thus, after Olmstead, the Fourth Amendment did not protect 
against technological surveillance unless the technology 
 
 120 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 121 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id.; See also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (applying 
Justice Harlan’s two-prong test). 
 124 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456-57 (1928), overruled by Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967). 
 125 Id. at 442-43. 
 126 Id. at 457. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. at 466. 
 129 Id. at 465. 
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somehow tangibly intruded in a protected place.130 The Court 
honored this rigid view of the Fourth Amendment for nearly 
four decades, permitting law enforcement to use other 
surveillance technologies like detectaphones 131  and wiretaps 
without a warrant. 
The Court finally reversed track in 1967 in Katz v. United 
States.132 There, police surreptitiously attached a listening device 
to a public telephone booth and listened to the conversations of 
a suspected gambler.133 Katz appealed his conviction by arguing 
that the use of a listening device inside a phone booth violated 
the Fourth Amendment.134 The Court agreed with Katz, finding 
that the use of a warrantless wiretapping device on a public 
phone violated the Fourth Amendment because the “Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places, from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.” 135  Even though the police never 
physically invaded Katz’s personal property, and even though 
Katz was using a public phone booth, the Court concluded that 
he had a reasonable expectation that his words would not be 
“broadcast to the world.”136 Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz 
set out a two-prong test to determine whether the action of a 
state agent violates the bar on unreasonable searches and 
seizures. According to Harlan, courts should ask (1) whether a 
person exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) 
whether society is ready to recognize that subjective 
expectation as reasonable.137 In later cases, including Jones, the 
Court has relied on this test to determine whether a police 
surveillance technology requires a warrant before use. 
B. The Jurisprudential Assumptions of Police Surveillance 
In applying the Katz test to emerging surveillance 
technologies the Court has relied on two important 
jurisprudential assumptions: first, an individual has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in anything they expose to the 
public or a third party, and second, policing technologies that 
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merely improve the efficiency of otherwise legal policing tactics 
do not violate a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Each 
of these assumptions was once defensible, but decreasingly so 
in our technologically efficient state. 
1. Assumption One: No Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy in Actions Exposed to Others 
The first major assumption of police surveillance law is 
that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
anything they expose to the public or a third party. Historically, 
the Court has relied on this assumption as a fundamental 
building block for numerous jurisprudential doctrines, including 
the open fields doctrine, the third party doctrine, and the 
misplaced trust doctrine. Today, this assumption grounds the 
belief that police can observe and record all public behavior—
whether that surveillance comes in the form of aerial 
observation,138 surveillance of driving movements,139 or through 
the use of some other digitally efficient technology. 
One of the earliest judicial default rules premised on 
this presumption is the open fields doctrine.140 Established in 
Hester v. United States 141  and later reaffirmed in Oliver v. 
United States,142 this doctrine clarified that individuals have no 
reasonable or constitutionally protected expectation of privacy 
in open fields. For example, in Hester, two state agents 
trespassed onto a criminal suspect’s land and observed him in 
possession of illegal alcohol.143 The Court held that, even if the 
officers had unlawfully trespassed onto the suspect’s land, the 
subsequent observation of liquor was not an unreasonable 
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.144 The agents 
made these observations from an open field, and the Court held 
that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
observations made from an open field.145 The Court reaffirmed 
the open fields doctrine in 1984 in Oliver. There the justices 
found that the open field doctrine does not conflict with the 
two-prong test handed down in Katz.146 Individuals do not have 
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a reasonable expectation of privacy in actions executed in open 
fields because they cannot reasonably expect that such actions 
will be free from “government interference or surveillance.”147 
Implicit in the open fields doctrine is a notion that 
individuals should not expect privacy in such environments 
because such locations are often visible to other people. Thus, 
the open fields doctrine is premised upon a conception of privacy 
that rigidly distinguishes between private and public. When 
people make any action public through committing it in a 
potentially public environment, such as an open field, they 
thereby expose that behavior to the world. In such scenarios, 
the Court has historically held that the person loses any 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 
The third-party doctrine also relies on a belief that all 
information exposed to others deserves no protection under the 
Fourth Amendment. In United States v. Miller, the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) acquired bank records 
related to Miller’s alcohol distillery.148 The Court held that the 
ATF did not need a warrant to obtain Miller’s bank records 
because the records contained “only information voluntarily 
conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the 
ordinary course of business.” 149  Thus, Miller stands for the 
proposition that, even when a person turns over records to a 
third party for a limited purpose, he assumes the risk that the 
third party will reveal those records to law enforcement.150 The 
Court has since reaffirmed this rule in various different scenarios, 
including in Smith v. Maryland. There, police installed a device 
known as a pen register on a criminal suspect’s phone without a 
warrant.151 The pen register gave law enforcement a record of 
every phone number the suspect dialed.152 The Court found this 
kind of law enforcement tactic constitutional because it merely 
recorded the numbers dialed, not the content of the 
communications. While a person has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their communications over a telephone, they should 
realize that a phone company has a legitimate business need to 
record numbers dialed. 153  Thus, by using a telephone, users 
should reasonably expect that a third party is or could be 
compiling data on the numbers they dial.154 In such situations, 
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“a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”155 
The misplaced trust doctrine similarly rests on a 
presumption that individuals risk observation and investigation 
every time they reveal any words or behaviors to third parties. 
Soon after Katz, the Court held in United States v. White that 
police could legally record conversations between informants and 
criminal suspects without a warrant; even if a person has every 
reason to trust that the information shared will be private, he 
cannot reasonably be certain that such information will stay 
private.156 Even if that suspect has a misplaced trust in the 
informant, the suspect assumes the risk by conveying personal 
information. This reaffirmed the Court’s holding from an 
earlier case, Hoffa v. United States, that stated that “[t]he risk 
of being overheard by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an 
informer or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one 
deals is probably inherent in the conditions of human society. 
It is the kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we 
speak.”157 Whether you turn over bank records to a financial 
assistant, 158  phone numbers to a phone company, 159  or 
confidential information to a supposed friend, 160  you lose 
virtually any reasonable expectation of privacy. Similarly, if 
your actions end up being visible to other people,161 even on 
your own property, you cannot reasonably expect privacy. 
The Court has continued to adhere to this jurisprudential 
assumption in cases involving advanced technological 
surveillance by law enforcement. Three of the most prominent 
pre-Jones cases involving technologically advanced police 
surveillance mechanisms, Florida v. Riley, 162  Dow Chemical 
Company v. United States,163 and United States v. Knotts,164 all 
appear to abide by this jurisprudential assumption. 
The Riley case involved a police helicopter that flew 
approximately 400 feet above a suspect’s greenhouse.165  The 
owner had partially enclosed the greenhouse and covered the 
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top of the greenhouse with corrugated roof panels.166 Some of 
these panels were clear, some opaque.167 The owner had only 
left about 10% of the roof uncovered by roofing panels.168 By 
flying over this structure in a helicopter, a police officer could 
visually identify marijuana growing inside the greenhouse.169 
The Court ruled that, because the owner would reasonably 
expect there to be air traffic over this greenhouse, he had to 
reasonably expect that aircraft flying over the structure could 
see inside. 170  Adhering to the first assumption of police 
surveillance law, the Court rejected the suspect’s privacy claim 
on the basis that he had implicitly made his marijuana farm 
public to those flying above. 
The Court reached a very similar conclusion in Dow 
Chemical.171 In that case, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) used an aerial camera to photograph a manufacturing 
facility in Midland, Michigan. 172  The aircraft never left 
navigable airspace and took photographs from between 1,200 
and 12,000 feet.173 The camera allowed the EPA to gain an 
extremely close-up look at details in the facility—“a great deal 
more than the human eye could ever see.” 174  Even so, the 
resultant pictures were not significantly distinguishable from 
those used to make maps. 175  While Dow has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy inside its building facilities, the Court 
determined that the outside of the facility—particularly when 
viewed from above—is more akin to an open field. 176  This 
means that “observation of persons in aircraft lawfully in the 
public airspace immediately above or sufficiently near the 
area” does not offend the Fourth Amendment.177 
Finally, in Knotts, the Court upheld the use of a 
warrantless radio transmitter tracking device installed inside a 
chemical drum purchased by a criminal suspect. Police believed 
that the suspect was using certain chemicals in the production 
of illegal substances.178 With the permission of the chemical 
company, police installed the tracking device on a chloroform 
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container before the chemical company handed it over to the 
suspect.179 The officers then used a radio receiver to acquire 
occasional signals emitted by the tracker; these signals helped 
the officials generally follow the suspect, but did not reveal his 
precise location in the way GPS can today.180 The officers used 
this device to establish probable cause for a warrant.181 Upon 
executing the warrant, police discovered that the suspect was 
part of an extensive methamphetamine laboratory. 182  The 
suspect challenged his conviction by claiming that the tracking 
device violated his reasonable expectation of privacy. 183  The 
Court rejected his claim, arguing that the suspect had a 
diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile on a public 
thoroughfare.184 The court reasoned that when a car travels in 
public, “both its occupants and its contents are in plain view”;185 
the suspect’s “direction[,] . . . stops . . . and . . . final destination” 
were all “voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look.”186 
Consequently, the Court upheld the admission of evidence 
acquired via the tracking device.187 
In sum, the Court has tightly honored the traditional 
assumption that anything exposed to the public is presumptively 
outside the bounds of Fourth Amendment protection. Such an 
assumption has traditionally been workable given the limited 
scope of investigative technologies. Surveillance technologies—
be they aerial photography or radio transmitters—could only 
collect information on a limited number of suspects over a 
limited period of time. Police were forced to choose which 
suspects to surveil, thereby limiting the overall scope of public 
surveillance efforts. As the digitally efficient investigative state 
grows in strength, however, this assumption is becoming 
dangerously unsupportable. 
2. Assumption Two: The Courts Should Not Limit 
Police Efficiency 
The second major jurisprudential assumption of police 
surveillance is that policing technologies that merely improve 
the efficiency of otherwise legal policing tactics do not violate a 
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person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. These efficiency-
enhancing technologies are typically contrasted with 
technologies that give police a pervasive, extrasensory ability. 
The Court has long displayed a reluctance to regulate police 
efficiency. As early as Dow Chemical, the Court was quick to 
note that, although an aerial camera can get a very precise 
view of images below, “[t]he photographs were not so revealing 
of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns. The mere 
fact that human vision is enhanced somewhat, at least to the 
degree here, does not give rise to constitutional problems.”188 
Indeed, the Court has long distinguished between sense-
enhancing technologies and extrasensory technologies.189 While 
the Court has restricted the use of certain extrasensory 
technologies, it has been reluctant to restrict any technologies 
that merely improve the efficiency of otherwise legitimate 
police surveillance techniques. 
The United States v. Kyllo190 case typifies the Court’s 
approach to extrasensory technology, while the White 191  and 
Knotts192 cases are examples of the Court’s deference toward 
efficiency-enhancing technologies. In Kyllo, law enforcement 
officials suspected the defendant of growing marijuana in his 
home by using high-intensity lamps.193 Police knew that such 
high-intensity lamps would produce a significant amount of 
heat.194 From the outside of the house, an officer used a heat-
sensing device to scan the inside of the defendant’s house.195 
The device was capable of showing differences in heat within 
the house. 196  The officer found that the home’s garage was 
substantially warmer than the rest of the house, which was 
consistent with the growing of marijuana via indoor heat 
lamps.197 Based on this information, police obtained a warrant 
to search the home and found marijuana inside the garage, 
which was used to secure a conviction. 198  The defendant 
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challenged the unwarranted use of the heat sensor by claiming 
that its use violated his reasonable expectation of privacy.199 
The Court agreed, holding that this type of warrantless, 
extrasensory surveillance violated the constitution because it 
was capable of “explor[ing] the details of the home that would 
previously have been unknowable without physical 
intrusion . . . .”200 Justice Stevens, in attempting to justify the 
warrantless use of this technology in his dissent, tried to 
categorize heat sensors as an efficiency-enhancing technology: 
“the ordinary use of the senses might enable a neighbor or 
passerby to notice the heat emanating from a building . . . .”201 
But the majority of the Court ultimately disagreed, finding the 
use of a heat sensor without a warrant to be unconstitutionally 
extrasensory in nature.202 
This contrasts with the White and Knotts cases. In each 
of those cases, the Court concluded that the police do not need 
to acquire a warrant before using a technological replacement 
for everyday police activity.203 In White, the Court noted that an 
undercover officer does not violate a suspect’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy by taking notes on the conversation.204 
Thus, it should come as no surprise that the Court has 
consistently held that police may engage in warrantless 
recording of conversations while undercover. 205  As Justice 
White persuasively argued: 
If the conduct and revelations of an agent operating without electronic 
equipment do not invade the defendant’s constitutionally justifiable 
expectations of privacy, neither does a simultaneous recording of the 
same conversations made by the agent or by others from 
transmissions received from the agent to whom the defendant is 
talking and whose trustworthiness the defendant necessarily risks.206 
The Court made the same basic argument in the Knotts 
case. There, the Court concluded that the warrantless use of a 
tracking device was nothing more than a digital replacement 
for traditional observational surveillance. 207  If police had 
unlimited resources and officers, they could have conceivably 
tracked the criminal suspect with the same accuracy. The 
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digital tracking device was nothing more than an efficiency-
enhancing technology. As such, the justices upheld the 
warrantless use of the technology because the court “never 
equated police efficiency with unconstitutionality.”208 
The Court, though, does not always rely upon a complete 
dichotomy between efficiency-enhancing and extrasensory 
technologies. The Court does permit the unwarranted use of 
certain extrasensory technologies, depending on the quantity 
and type of information revealed by the technology.209 The Dow 
Chemical case epitomizes this exception to the rule. Recall that 
when the state used aerial cameras to zoom into details on the 
Dow Chemical facility below, the Court acknowledged that no 
police officer could have seen images in such fine detail without 
the assistance of the camera.210 This seems to suggest that the 
technology was more akin to a heat sensor (extrasensory) than 
an audio record recorder (efficiency-enhancer). But the Court 
nonetheless permitted the warrantless use of this technology 
because of the limited amount of private information it could 
potentially uncover by photographing a business facility from 
above.211 Because the only possible information that the aerial 
photography could obtain was pictures of an open field, the 
technology could only minimally invade any person’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy. 
This raises an important question—if a technology could 
record, through extrasensory methods, evidence of illegal 
behavior only, would police ever need to obtain a warrant to use 
this technology? One emerging technology might raise this very 
question. 212  The United States intelligence community has 
made a substantial investment in laser-based molecular 
scanners.213 The technology is up to ten million times faster and 
a million times more sensitive than any other technology 
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currently available.214 It can immediately ascertain everything 
about a passing person—from small drug residue to gun 
powder—from up to 50 meters away.215 Police can operate this 
technology without passing pedestrians even knowing it is in 
operation.216 Such a technology is undeniably extrasensory in 
nature. No human could possibly detect the presence of illegal 
substances on a molecular level. The technology could 
theoretically be calibrated to uncover only the presence of illegal 
substances. The Court has generally held that the use of an 
extrasensory aid, like a canine, that should only alert officers to 
the presence of an illegal drug does not require a warrant, or 
even reasonable suspicion before use.217 But the widespread use 
of a technology like laser-based molecular scanners could 
someday force the Court to rethink this conclusion.218 
To summarize, while the Court has generally upheld the 
assumption that police may freely use efficiency-enhancing 
technologies, police must obtain authorization before turning to 
extrasensory technology. They have tempered this dichotomy in 
cases where the extrasensory aid can only alert police to the likely 
presence of illegal behavior. But that assumption may become 
more and more unjustified in light of technological advancement. 
C. Jones and the Emerging Doctrinal Incoherence 
Before Jones, the Court had relied on these two 
jurisprudential assumptions of police surveillance. But Jones 
forced the Court to consider how these assumptions fit with the 
increasingly efficient, digital surveillance of the twenty-first 
century. It is worth mentioning at the outset that the technology 
at issue in Jones is distinguishable from the digitally efficient 
investigative technologies discussed in this article. The law 
enforcement agency used the GPS device in Jones to only 
monitor the movements of a single criminal suspect. While the 
device could efficiently monitor the movements of a single person, it 
was not part of a dragnet surveillance technique that collected 
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surveillance data on the entire community.219 Thus, it is hard to 
predict how the Court will eventually handle the digitally efficient 
investigative state based solely on their treatment of GPS devices. 
Even so, the Jones decision gave the Court a clear opportunity to 
directly confront the jurisprudential assumptions of police 
surveillance. 
In the case, police suspected that nightclub owner and 
operator Antoine Jones was trafficking narcotics.220 The Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and the D.C. Metropolitan Police 
Department used a variety of investigation techniques, 
including the installation of a surveillance camera, pen 
registers, and a wiretap of Jones’s cell phone. 221  Based on 
potentially incriminating information obtained through these 
measures, law enforcement successfully acquired a warrant to 
install a GPS device on Jones’s Jeep Cherokee.222 The warrant 
only authorized law enforcement to install the device within a 
10-day time period while the automobile was in Washington, 
D.C.223 Rather than following the terms of the warrant, police 
installed the device “[o]n the 11th day, and not in the District 
of Columbia but in Maryland . . . .”224 Thus, while the police had 
initially obtained a warrant for the GPS device, the warrant 
was no longer valid at the time of installation. Police installed 
the device by attaching it to the underside of the Jeep while it 
was parked in a public lot.225 
Over the next 28 days, police tracked the movement of 
Jones’s automobile.226 The police even replaced the battery on 
the GPS device at one point while the car was again in a public 
parking lot in Maryland.227 Because the GPS device was only 
affixed to Jones’s car, the police could only monitor the movement 
of his car along public thoroughfares.228 Still, the police acquired 
over 2,000 pages of data during this time period, some of which 
helped build the government’s case against Jones and his co-
conspirators for conspiracy to distribute and possession with the 
intent to distribute cocaine.229 Jones challenged the admission 
of the GPS data in the District Court. But the court permitted 
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nearly all of this data into evidence, citing Knotts for the 
proposition that an individual has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in public movements.230 The district court jury found 
Jones guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment.231 
In a fascinating decision though, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia overturned the 
conviction, ruling that the installation and data collection 
violated the Fourth Amendment.232 The D.C. Circuit reached 
this conclusion by centering their analysis on whether a person 
has a reasonable expectation that their movements will not be 
recorded in an extended, uninterrupted manner.233 Because the 
marginal cost of every day GPS surveillance is “effectively zero,” 
police could monitor a person’s movement cheaply and incredibly 
efficiently.234 In applying a so-called “mosaic theory,” the court 
noted that “long-term surveillance of an individual reveals 
important and intimate details about their behaviors.” 235  The 
court therefore concluded that police should obtain a valid 
warrant before using technology that can reveal such intimate 
and private details of one’s life.236 
This was a radical doctrinal shift that fundamentally 
undermined both of the jurisprudential assumptions of police 
surveillance. By finding that the recording of personal 
surveillance data on public movement at some point violates the 
Fourth Amendment, the D.C. Circuit indicated that it presumably 
believes that a person can have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in public. This undermines the first assumption of police 
surveillance law, which says that people have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in public. The second jurisprudential 
assumption of police surveillance, that the courts should not limit 
improvements on policing efficiency, is likewise upended if a 
technology like GPS can become unconstitutionally invasive based 
merely on its ability to enhance the efficiency of surveillance. 
The Supreme Court unanimously agreed with the D.C. 
Circuit that the installation of a GPS device violated the 
Fourth Amendment. The Court, though, split on why this kind 
of surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment. Five of the 
justices—Justice Scalia writing the majority with Justices 
Thomas, Roberts, Sotomayor, and Kennedy joining—held that 
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the installation of a GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment 
because of the device’s physical installation on the automobile.237 
These justices were not yet prepared to uphold the mosaic theory 
advanced by the D.C. Circuit. Instead, they emphasized that, 
because the attachment of the GPS device amounted to a 
technical trespass, it violated the original understanding of the 
Fourth Amendment.238 The majority did not discount, though, 
that the Court might have to reconsider some of the basic 
jurisprudential assumptions of police surveillance law. Scalia 
cited Knotts in explaining that GPS is a mere technological 
replacement for traditional surveillance, which has always been 
upheld as constitutionally permissible without a warrant. 239 
Scalia noted that, while “[i]t may be that achieving the same 
results through electronic means, without any accompanying 
trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy,” the Jones 
case “[did] not require [the Court] to answer that question.”240 
The Court has never recognized that long-term surveillance 
amounts to an unconstitutional search, and the majority 
argued that attempting to do so now would force the court to 
unnecessarily grapple with many “vexing problems.”241 
Justice Sotomayor wrote separately to note that long-term 
and efficient technological surveillance might impinge on a 
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.242 Sotomayor concluded 
that “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an 
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”243 Nevertheless, Sotomayor 
felt that this police action could be found unconstitutional based on 
the trespass of personal property alone.244 By contrast, four of the 
justices—Justice Alito writing the concurring opinion with 
Justices Kagan, Breyer, and Ginsburg joining—concluded that 
the installation of a GPS device violated the suspect’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy by aggregating copious 
amounts of data on his public actions.245 These justices believed 
that the majority’s focus on the physical trespass of the device 
was reminiscent of the Olmstead era decisions that emphasized 
physical trespass as a necessity to any claim of unreasonable 
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search and seizure.246 According to Justice Alito, the majority’s 
reasoning generally ignores the important privacy interests at 
stake in the long-term use of GPS tracking, and instead 
“attaches great significance to something that most would view 
as relatively minor”—the attachment of a small device to the 
bottom of a car. 247  Such a viewpoint makes no distinction 
between the use of GPS tracking for a single day or many 
years.248  In Alito’s mind, there is clearly a distinction to be 
made between brief electronic surveillance and extended 
surveillance; long-term surveillance reveals detailed 
information about personal behavior and habits, while short-
term does not. But above all, Alito’s concurrence appears to 
express concern that the majority’s rationale does nothing to 
address electronic surveillance that does not involve physical 
trespass.249 
Alito believes that the Court should look at surveillance 
techniques on a case-by-case basis and judge whether the 
electronic surveillance used “involved a degree of intrusion that 
a reasonable person would not have anticipated.”250 Using this 
test, Alito would permit the short-term use of electronic 
surveillance on public streets, but bar the use of long-term 
surveillance for most criminal offenses.251 “For such offenses, 
society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and 
others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—
secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an 
individual’s car for a very long period.”252 
The Alito recommendation is similar to the proposal I 
made two years ago.253 His solution would involve the judiciary 
limiting the length of data retention for surveillance 
technologies. He would permit longer retention in cases where 
police are investigating serious criminal offenses. And he 
emphasizes that the legislature may be the most appropriate 
branch to regulate these technologies long-term. Similarly, I 
argued that the judiciary should regulate the digitally efficient 
investigative state by limiting the length of data retention.254 I 
 
 246 Id. at 959. 
 247 Id. at 961. 
 248 Id. (noting that the “Court’s approach leads to incongruous results” 
because it would make no distinction between use of the GPS device for “a brief time” 
or a “much longer period [of time]”). 
 249 Id. at 962. 
 250 Id. at 964. 
 251 Id. 
 252 Id. 
 253 Rushin, supra note 8, at 318. 
 254 Id. 
40 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1 
emphasized the need for the judiciary to not establish a firm 
limit on data retention and surveillance, thereby giving police 
latitude to adjust the use of these technologies to the relative 
seriousness of the crime being investigated and the relative 
threat posed by the suspected criminal offense.255 I concluded 
that the “legislatures must play a critical role in developing 
more nuanced and specific enactments” that elaborate specific 
regulations for the use of surveillance technology.256 Both my 
recommended solution and Alito’s represent a limited 
acceptance of the so-called mosaic theory that recognizes that 
the aggregation of long-term electronic surveillance data can be 
so revealing of personal details as to become an unreasonable 
search or seizure. 
After the Jones decision, it seems likely that the Court 
will someday break away from the two jurisprudential 
assumptions of mass police surveillance. At least five of the 
justices showed clear support for the adoption of some version 
of the mosaic theory. And even the justices that did not 
officially support the future adoption of such a doctrinal path 
acknowledged that it might be necessary in the future. But, 
this raises two important questions—how should we begin to 
regulate the use of these surveillance devices, and what branch 
of government should do the regulating? 
Scholars are sharply divided on the appropriateness of 
judicially regulating emerging technologies. Orin Kerr has been 
perhaps the most outspoken and persuasive critic of judicial 
policymaking in such cases. Kerr has advanced three important 
arguments in support of this position: (1) the courts lack the 
physical and administrative resources to develop comprehensive 
policies, (2) judges are not technologically sophisticated enough 
to craft technology regulations, and (3) these judicial regulations 
rarely hold up in different factual situations.257 After the Jones 
decision, Kerr also argued that if the Court were to adopt the 
mosaic theory, it would necessarily have to confront many 
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extremely difficult choices. 258  Thus, Kerr believes that the 
Court should avoid such a path in the future.259 
I disagree with Kerr’s conclusions on the limited 
institutional capacity of the judiciary to regulate emerging 
surveillance technology. But even if the Court does eventually 
adopt some version of the mosaic theory—as I believe they will—
this judicial response will be very limited. Thereafter, state 
legislatures will ultimately have to develop most nuanced 
regulations of these devices going forward.260 In the next section, 
I develop a model state statute that could address some of the 
major problems implicated by the digitally efficient state. 
III. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 
Any future judicial response must be coupled with state 
legislation. Even if the judiciary eventually accepts some 
version of the mosaic theory in interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment, we should not expect the Court to hand down 
detailed regulations for the use of these technologies. Justice 
Alito’s concurrence in Jones is telling. His proposal to regulate 
the efficiency of surveillance technologies would only control 
data retention. 261  And the amount of data that a police 
department could reasonably retain without a warrant would 
vary from one situation to the next based upon the relative 
seriousness of the possible crime at issue. 262  This barely 
scratches the surface of broader problems posed by the digitally 
efficient state. Under what conditions should we permit 
extensive data retention? When should we limit this kind of 
retention? Is data aggregation more acceptable as long as the 
data is not cross-referenced with other databases, thereby 
personally identifying individuals? Should we regulate law 
enforcement’s access to this personal data? And where should 
this data be stored? 
Even my original proposal for judicial regulation of 
mass police surveillance only addressed a handful of these 
questions. I recommended that courts require police to develop 
clear data retention policies that are tailored to only retain 
data as long as necessary to serve a legitimate law enforcement 
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purpose.263 Like Alito’s proposal, such a standard would vary 
according to the seriousness of the crime under investigation 
and the individual circumstance. I also argued that in cases 
where police retain surveillance data without a warrant 
through electronic means, they should have a legitimate law 
enforcement purpose before cross-referencing that data with 
other databases for the purposes of identifying individuals.264 
Both the Jones concurrence and my previous proposal 
would establish a broad judicial principle mandating that 
police regulate data retention according to the seriousness of 
the crime under investigation and the legitimate need for such 
retention. This type of judicial response is limited in nature. 
Legislative bodies would likely need to step in to provide more 
detailed standards. 
The legislative branch has several advantages over the 
judiciary that make it appropriate for this type of detailed policy 
building. The legislature has a wider range of enforcement 
mechanisms than the judiciary. The legislature can mandate in-
depth and regular oversight. And it has the resources and tools 
to develop extensive, complex regulations. As a result, the 
legislature is the best-positioned branch to address some of the 
critical issues raised by the digitally efficient investigative 
state, such as data storage, access, and sharing policies. 
In this Part, I offer guidelines for a legislative response 
to mass police surveillance. I first detail some of the 
foundational principles that legislative bodies ought to recognize 
in regulating police use of technology. Next, I give a brief 
overview of how a handful of states have attempted to regulate 
these technologies. I conclude by offering and defending my 
statutory recommendations. 
A. Foundational Principles for Regulating Police 
Surveillance Technology 
In making this legislative recommendation, I rely on 
three foundational principles about legislative regulation of law 
enforcement technologies. First, any regulation must provide 
clear and articulable standards that law enforcement can and 
will easily enforce.265 Courts and legislators have often agreed 
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that police regulations should be easy to apply across many 
different factual circumstances. 266  If a regulation is unclear, 
there is a higher probability that law enforcement will, even in 
good faith, misapply the standard. For example, in Atwater v. 
City of Lago Vista, Texas state law permitted officers to arrest 
offenders who violated traffic laws for failure to wear a 
seatbelt, even though the final punishment for such a violation 
was a mere fine.267 In upholding an officer’s decision to arrest a 
woman for failure to buckle her seatbelt, the Court stressed 
that police need rules that emphasize “clarity and simplicity.”268 
Earlier regulations have encountered resistance from 
law enforcement because they were not easily administrable 
standards. For example, in Arizona v. Gant, the Court upended 
a longstanding doctrine that said police could search an 
automobile incident to an arrest of a person in that vehicle.269 
The new standard said that police “may search a vehicle 
incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is 
within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the 
time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle 
contains evidence of the offense of arrest.”270 Justice Alito found 
this new standard undesirable compared to the previous 
standard. In Alito’s mind, the Court should strive for “a test that 
would be relatively easy for police officers and judges to 
apply.”271 While some commentators disagree about the relative 
importance of clear and simple rules, 272  most judges and 
policymakers agree that any policymaker should consider the 
administrability of a mandate. 
Clear and simple rules also have another advantage 
over ambiguous mandates—these kinds of clear directives are 
less susceptible to organizational mediation. 273  If a state 
regulation of a policing organization is “vague or ambiguous,” 
the police organization may “mediate the implementation and 
impact the law.” 274  Lauren Edelman had demonstrated this 
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type of mediation in the case of equal employment and 
affirmative action laws that are intended to change the 
behavior of private organizations. 275  These initial laws only 
established broad regulatory goals without offering clear and 
explicit procedural limitations. 276  This type of ambiguous 
mandate gave private companies room to interpret the laws 
and construct the meaning of compliance, thereby mediating 
“the impact of the law on society.”277 
In the past, the police have been guilty of organizational 
mediation of a variety of legal mandates. The general police 
response to Miranda is particularly demonstrative of this 
phenomenon. Scholars like Richard Leo and Charles Weisselberg 
have carefully shown how police have navigated around the 
limitations of the original Miranda decision to nonetheless engage 
in seemingly coercive interrogation techniques aimed at acquiring 
information. 278  The original Miranda opinion provided some 
limitations on interrogations, but the decision and subsequent 
holdings may have been ambiguous, thereby allowing for 
departments to navigate around them without technically 
violating the law. Thus, in crafting rules for police, both the 
Court and legislatures should aim to create easily administrable 
law enforcement rules if at all possible, but also laws that are 
specific enough to avoid organizational mediation. 
Second, communities differ in their need for public 
surveillance. For example, New York City and Washington, 
D.C. have previously been targets for international terrorism. 
Given their plethora of high value targets and landmarks, 
these two cities may have a legitimate need for more public 
surveillance than other communities.279 In arguing for a malleable 
standard for local departments, the IACP has suggested that 
some locations—namely bridges, critical infrastructure, and other 
high value targets—demand more surveillance and data retention 
to ensure public safety.280 As an example, the IACP cites the 
fact that locations targeted on September 11, 2001 were part of 
a terrorist attack that took many years to plan and execute.281 
 
 275 See generally Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic 
Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531 (1992). 
 276 Id. at 1532-33. 
 277 Id. at 1532. 
 278 See generally Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1519 (2008); Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 266 (1996). 
 279 See Rushin, supra note 8, at 321. 
 280 Id. 
 281 INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT 
FOR THE UTILIZATION OF LICENSE PLATE READERS 40 n.70 (Sept. 2009) [hereinafter IACP 
2013] MASS POLICE SURVEILLANCE 45 
Thus, certain communities may legitimately need and prefer 
longer retention periods around certain important targets. 
Conversely, a medium-sized suburb with low crime that places 
a higher value on privacy might prefer a bar on the retention of 
surveillance data all together. While any state statute should 
establish minimally acceptable requirements on data retention, 
the law must be sufficiently broad to permit necessary variation 
at the local level. A one-size-fits-all approach may not be 
workable, given the unique law enforcement needs of each city. 
Third, any regulation must clearly articulate the narrow 
scope of technologies and devices that fall under its regulatory 
purview. Because technology changes rapidly, this ensures that 
the law will not be misapplied to future, emerging technologies. 
Kerr has previously argued that regulations of technology 
ought to proceed cautiously until the technology has stabilized.282 
Technology may have unforeseen uses that will take time to 
develop and understand. For example, in 1988, Congress passed 
the Video Privacy Protection Act.283 This law protected the privacy 
of videotape rental information.284 Congress passed the law after 
Judge Robert Bork’s video rental history became public during his 
Supreme Court nomination process. 285  But in crafting this 
limitation on video rentals, Congress defined the term “video tape 
service provider” expansively as “any person, engaged in the 
business . . . of rental, sale, or delivery of prerecorded video 
cassette tapes or similar audio visual material.”286 
On one hand, this expansive definition of a videotape 
service provider is useful because it is broad enough to avoid 
antiquation. As videotape technology waned in popularity and 
DVDs became the chosen medium for most movie rental 
providers, the law maintained its statutory force. But the 
vague language used by the original drafters of the law left 
online streaming content providers like Netflix wondering 
whether the law actually applied to their services.287 It was also 
unclear what kind of approval Netflix and other providers had 
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to obtain to allow users to share their viewing history on social 
media platforms like Facebook. 288  After years of ambiguity, 
Congress recently amended the law to permit users to share 
content watching habits on streaming sites like Netflix after 
they have given one-time approval.289 
Before the law change, Netflix complained that the law’s 
language was confusing, making them hesitant to adopt social 
media integration.290 Similarly, when regulating police technology 
use, legislative bodies should adopt language that is sufficiently 
broad to avoid immediate antiquation. They should also be careful 
not to select language that is so overly broad as to limit the use 
of new, potentially important technological tools. 
The legislative recommendation I make in this Part 
attempts to follow these three guiding principles: it attempts to 
(1) clearly define the limited scope of the applicable technologies, 
(2) be clear and simple for law enforcement to administer, and (3) 
permit some level of local variation to meet the needs of unique 
municipalities. My starting point for crafting this model was to 
analyze the small number of statutes already passed by state 
legislators. The next section looks at these statutes to 
demonstrate common trends. 
B. Current State Regulations 
A handful of states have laid out regulations of the 
digitally efficient investigative state. These state laws operate 
by either regulating ALPR and surveillance cameras specifically, 
or by establishing broad standards for data retention. For 
example, states like Virginia have passed relatively broad laws 
that regulate the retention of data by the government in all 
forms. 291  In other states, like New Jersey, the state attorney 
general has used state constitutional authority to hand down 
directives regulating the use of ALPR and establishing 
limitations on data collection.292 States like Maine, Arkansas, 
New Hampshire, Vermont, and Utah have regulated ALPR 
through legislative measures.293 Some states, like New York, 
have also handed down suggested model guidelines to inform 
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internal policymakers. 294  In this section, I demonstrate that 
most of these early efforts to regulate the digitally efficient 
surveillance technologies share a handful of common concerns. 
They limit the identification of personal data, the length of 
data retention, the sharing of information with other 
departments, and law enforcement access to stored data. These 
early models also rely on a bevy of enforcement mechanisms. 
Thus, any model legislation aimed at holistically managing the 
digitally efficient investigative state should consider the 
possible solutions offered by existing laws. 
First, the laws generally limit the length of data 
retention in some way. Maine’s law on ALPR limits retention to 
21 days. 295  New Hampshire also puts a strict limit on the 
collection of law enforcement data, barring “retention of 
surveillance data except for a few, specific situations.” 296  By 
stark contrast, the New Jersey Attorney General has ordered 
that data be retained for no more than five years. 297  Model 
guidelines like those offered by the State of New York do not 
establish a maximum length of data retention,298 but the New 
York recommendations do encourage departments to establish 
a clear policy on the length of data retention.299 Arkansas limits 
retention to 150 days,300 Utah allows retention by government 
agents for nine months,301 and Vermont permits retention for 
up to 18 months.302 Each of these statutes reaches a different 
conclusion on the appropriate length of data retention. The 
disparity between the New Jersey data retention limit of five 
years and relatively strict retention limits in states like Maine 
and New Hampshire is striking. But the Maine law might not 
be as restrictive as it initially appears. Although it does limit 
retention in most cases to 21 days, it also makes an exception 
for cases where law enforcement is engaged in an ongoing 
investigation or intelligence operation. 303  Overall, state 
legislatures have reached dramatically different conclusions on 
the relative threat posed by long-term data retention. 
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Second, a few of the available laws demonstrate a 
concern for the identification of personal data collected by the 
state. The New Jersey Attorney General Directive intends in 
part to limit the “disclos[ure] [of] personal identifying 
information about an individual unless there is a legitimate 
and documented law enforcement reason for disclosing such 
personal information to a law enforcement officer or civilian 
crime analyst.”304 In New York, the model guidelines would also 
require that officers attempting to query stored data for 
identifying matches have a legitimate law enforcement purpose 
for doing so, and that they record their identification 
procedure. 305  Neither Maine nor New Hampshire has a 
substantial policy on the identification of data, likely due in 
large part to their strict limitations on retention.306 The longer a 
state legislature permits data retention, the more legitimately 
concerned it may be about the possibility of this data becoming 
personally identified. After all, the combination of long-scale 
retention and data identification procedures may allow law 
enforcement to create “digital dossiers” on innocent people that 
reveal private information about their habits, preferences, and 
daily movements.307 
Third, the available laws and recommended models tend 
to put restrictions on the sharing of information with other 
agencies. The New Jersey directive permits the sharing of 
ALPR data among police departments in the state, provided 
that the departments keep records of the data being shared 
and all departments involved abide by the New Jersey rules.308 
Nonetheless, New Jersey uses regulations on sharing as a way 
to encourage the development of a consistent and organized 
state database.309 The Utah law permits sharing and disclosure 
only under narrow circumstances. 310  Arkansas, by contrast, 
strictly prohibits sharing of collected data.311 Other states, like 
New York, have been relatively hands-off when it comes to data 
sharing. They simply urge departments to build procedures for 
sharing data that are consistent with their overall 
recommendations on data protection.312 We may expect states 
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to want to encourage departments to share whatever data they 
can legally retain. By doing so, departments can have access to 
significantly more information on the potential whereabouts of 
criminal suspects who travel outside jurisdictional lines.313 
Fourth, available and model rules document and limit 
access to stored data. New Jersey’s regulation requires 
departments to record all user access to stored ALPR data, 
including the name of the user accessing the data, the time and 
date of the access, whether the person used automated 
software to analyze the data, and the name of the supervisor 
who authorized the access.314 New York’s model guidelines also 
suggest that departments document when officers search and 
analyze stored data.315 Officers should also only analyze data if 
they have a legitimate law enforcement purpose for doing so.316 
Additionally, the Maine provision stresses the importance of 
confidentiality in stored data.317 That law restricts access to law 
enforcement officers. 318  And in Vermont, the law explicitly 
states that access to stored data should be limited to specified 
or previously designated personnel.319 Thus, the current array 
of statutes acknowledges the need for limited access to 
available data and confidentiality of stored information. 
Fifth, some of the model regulations require 
departments to train employees in the proper procedures for 
handling data. They also discipline employees who fail to follow 
policy parameters. The New York suggested guidelines 
recommend that departments establish a list of designated 
personnel who are authorized to access ALPR data, 320  and 
encourage departments to establish a training program to 
teach officers about the proper use of ALPR technology.321 The 
New Jersey directive also requires that departments “designate 
all authorized users, and that no officer or civilian employee 
will be authorized to operate an ALPR, or to access or use 
ALPR stored data, unless the officer or civilian employee has 
received training by the department on the proper operation of 
these devices.” 322  Once more, the New Jersey directive 
mandates that “any sworn officer or civilian employee of the 
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agency who knowingly violates the agency’s policy, or these 
Guidelines, shall be subject to discipline.”323 Conversely, neither 
the Maine nor New Hampshire laws touch on officers’ training 
in data retention. 324  But this is likely because they do not 
permit significant data accumulation, thereby making training 
in data management less imperative. On the whole, those 
states and entities that do permit large-scale data collection 
also encourage officer training as a safeguard against abuse. 
Sixth, the current array of regulations uses a wide 
range of enforcement mechanisms. In New Jersey, as a penalty 
for non-compliance, the Attorney General maintains the 
authority to temporarily or permanently revoke a department’s 
right to use ALPR devices. 325  Arkansas provides for civil 
remedies for individuals when a violation of the law causes 
them actual harm.326 Utah, by contrast, simply makes violation 
of the statute a criminal misdemeanor. 327  Both the New 
Hampshire and the Maine laws have made the violation of 
ALPR regulations a criminal act in the state.328 Although New 
York’s regulations are non-mandatory, they still recommend 
that departments begin creating records in case the state 
someday begins to audit data access and retention records.329 
In sum, current state statutes and recommended 
guidelines address a number of concerns related to the digitally 
efficient state. It is worth noting again that these laws go far 
beyond anything the judiciary would likely implement. The 
Supreme Court is institutionally limited in its capacity to 
develop a response to the digitally efficient investigative state. 
The variation on the mosaic theory adopted by Alito in his 
Jones concurrence would only establish a broad principle that long-
term data retention by efficient public surveillance technologies 
may eventually violate a person’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy. Such a rule is ambiguous and does not touch on data 
storage, access, and identification. State legislation offers the 
possibility of establishing detailed and definitive standards. 
 
 323 Id. at 15. 
 324 ME. REV. STAT. 29-A, § 2117-A (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 236:130 (2011). 
 325 State of New Jersey, supra note 292, at 16. 
 326 ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1807 (2013). 
 327 UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-2006 (2013). 
 328 ME. REV. STAT. 29-A, § 2117-A(6); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 236:130(V) (2009). 
 329 N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIM. JUST. SERVS., supra note 294, at 16-17. 
2013] MASS POLICE SURVEILLANCE 51 
C. Model Statute to Regulate Police Surveillance 
The presently available statutes and model guidelines 
suggest a key set of concerns that any future state legislative 
body must consider. They demonstrate five common regulatory 
needs: data retention, identification, access, sharing, and 
training. The model statutory language I offer includes a 
possible solution for each of these areas. In doing so, I also try 
to honor the foundational principles for the regulation of police 
surveillance identified above. The model statute provides a 
clear standard that law enforcement agencies can implement. 
It attempts to give departments some latitude to alter their 
own policies to meet local needs. But the law also includes 
specific and detailed regulations in hopes of preventing 
organizational mediation. 
The proposed statute also includes multiple enforcement 
mechanisms to ensure compliance. The model excludes from 
criminal court any evidence obtained in violation of this statute, 
thus removing the incentive for police departments to violate the 
policy. Of course, evidentiary exclusion is “limited as a means for 
promoting institutional change” because it is filled with 
exceptions and is narrower than the scope of police misconduct.330 
Thus, I propose two additional enforcement mechanisms. First, 
the model statute gives the state attorney general authority to 
initiate litigation against departments that fail to comply with 
these mandates. Other statutes regulating police misconduct, like 
42 U.S.C. § 14141, have used a similar mechanism.331 Second, the 
model mandates periodic state audits of departmental policies 
and data records to ensure compliance. Overall, the proposed law 
broadly addresses many of the problems implicit in the digitally 
efficient state and establishes a number of enforcement 
mechanisms to ensure organizational compliance. 
1. Applicability, Definitions, and Scope 
The first part of the proposed statute defines the scope 
of the legislation, including the technologies regulated by the 
statute. In this section of the statute, I tried to reflect the 
foundational principle of regulating police surveillance technologies 
by creating a tightly defined scope of presently available 
technologies that fall under the statute’s regulatory purview. 
This might make the statute under-inclusive at some point in 
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the future, but works to the benefit of avoiding over-inclusivity 
that can stifle the development of new technologies.332 
§1 Applicability, Definitions, and Scope 
This statute applies to all community surveillance 
technologies used by law enforcement that collect 
personally identifiable, locational data. 
“Community surveillance technology” means any device 
intended to observe, compare, record, or ascertain 
information about individuals in public through the 
recording of personally identifiable information. This 
includes, but is not limited to, surveillance collected with 
automatic license plate readers, surveillance cameras, 
and surveillance cameras with biometric recognition. 
This scope provision specifically addresses community 
surveillance devices, such as ALPR and surveillance cameras, 
as distinguished from traditional surveillance tools like GPS 
devices and wiretaps. As I have previously argued, “networked 
community surveillance technologies like ALPR surveil an 
entire community as opposed to a specific individual.”333 While 
the use of a GPS device to monitor the movements of one 
criminal suspect over a long period of time might be 
constitutionally problematic, such a practice raises an entirely 
different set of public policy questions. At minimum, the kind of 
tracking at issue in Jones was narrowly tailored to only affect 
one criminal suspect. The digitally efficient investigative state 
uses community surveillance technologies like ALPR and 
surveillance cameras that can potentially track the movements 
of all individuals within an entire community regardless of 
whether there is any suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. Hence, 
this statute is carefully limited to a small subset of technologies 
that pose similar risks and thus require similar regulation. 
2. Differential Treatment of Observational Comparison 
and Indiscriminate Data Collection 
Next, I propose that state laws should differentiate 
between observational comparison and indiscriminate data 
collection. 334  The model law permits the use of community 
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surveillance technologies for observational comparison. When a 
department uses these technologies for observational comparison, 
the device is “an incredibly efficient law enforcement tool that is 
reasonably tailored to only flag the suspicious.”335 
§2 Observational Comparison and Indiscriminate Data 
Collection 
Police departments may use community surveillance 
technologies as needed for observational comparison. But 
police departments using community surveillance 
technologies for indiscriminate data retention must 
abide by data integrity, access, and privacy restrictions 
outlined in §3 through §6. 
“Observational comparison” is defined as the retention of 
locational or identifying data after an instantaneous 
cross-reference with a law enforcement database reveals 
reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. 
“Indiscriminate data collection” is defined as the 
retention of locational or identifying data without any 
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. 
This distinction strikes a reasonable balance by 
facilitating law enforcement efficiency in identifying lawbreakers, 
but also avoiding the unlimited and unregulated collection of 
data. When applied to ALPR, this statute would mean that police 
could use that technology to flag passing license plates that 
match lists of stolen cars or active warrants. But they could not 
retain locational data on license plates that do not raise any 
concerns of criminal activity without abiding by the regulations 
that follow. 
3. Data Integrity, Access, and Privacy 
I recommend that the indiscriminate collection of data 
be subject to four separate requirements that limit the 
retention, identification, access, and sharing of data. The 
statutory language below was designed to give law enforcement 
some leeway to create workable internal policies that meet 
organizational and community needs. As a result, the policy 
simply serves as a minimum floor of regulation, above which 
departments could adopt their own regulations. 
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§3 Data Retention  
Police departments using community surveillance 
technologies for indiscriminate data collection must 
establish and publicly announce a formalized policy on 
data retention. Departments may not retain and store 
data for more than one calendar year unless the data is 
connected to a specific and ongoing criminal 
investigation.  
The one-year retention period is the most significant 
regulation this statute would place on indiscriminate data 
collection. Even the IACP acknowledges that the “indefinite 
retention of law enforcement information makes a vast amount 
of data available for potential misuse or accidental 
disclosure.”336 Without limits on retention, police surveillance 
can develop into “a form of undesirable social control” that can 
actually “prevent people from engaging in activities that 
further their own self-development, and inhibit individuals 
from associating with others, which is sometimes critical for the 
promotion of free expression.” 337  At the same time, law 
enforcement often claim that information that seems irrelevant 
today may someday have significance to a future investigation.338 
Without regulation, there is a cogent argument to be made that 
police would have every incentive to keep as much data as 
possible.339 Thus, I recommend that data retention be capped at 
one year. This would prevent the potential harms of the 
digitally efficient investigative state that come from long-term 
data aggregation. 
The one-year time window represents a reasonable 
compromise. The median law enforcement department today 
retains data for around six months or less. 340  But before 
accepting this retention limit, state legislatures should 
critically assess their own state needs to determine whether 
there is a legitimate and verifiable need for retention beyond 
this point. The next section of the statute addresses 
identification of stored data. 
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§4 Data Identification 
Police employees must have a legitimate law enforcement 
purpose in identifying the person associated with any 
data retained by community surveillance technologies.  
The limit on data identification is somewhat different 
than most current statutory arrangements. This measure 
would, potentially, limit the ability of law enforcement to use 
the stored data for secondary uses. A secondary use is the use 
of data collected for one purpose for an unrelated, additional 
purpose.341 This kind of secondary use can “generate[ ]  fear and 
uncertainty over how one’s information will be used in the 
future.”342 By limiting the identification of the data, the statute 
attempts to prevent such secondary use. Another way to avoid 
secondary use is to limit access to data and external sharing, as 
I attempt to do in the next portions of the statute. 
§5 Internal Access to Stored Data 
Departments must establish a formal internal policy 
documenting each time a police employee accesses 
community surveillance databases. Departments shall 
not allow anyone except authorized and trained police 
employees to access and search these databases. 
§6 External Data Sharing  
Police departments may share information contained in 
community surveillance databases with other government 
agencies, as long as all participating departments honor 
the minimum requirements established in this statute.  
 I propose that police limit access to data even among 
police employees. And each time a police employee accesses 
data, I require that the department document this event. This 
achieves two results. First, it creates a record of previous 
access points that the attorney general or state criminal courts 
can, theoretically, use to hold police accountable for improper 
data access. Secondly, and relatedly, this formalized 
documentation process may prevent nefarious secondary uses 
of the information. Because some evidence suggests that police 
retain community surveillance data in databases accessible to 
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private companies and civilians,343 this would place the impetus 
on police departments to take responsibility for internal data 
management. And while the model statute does not limit the 
sharing of digitally efficient data, it does require that all 
departments with access to data abide by the statutory limits. 
This would promote the sharing of data across jurisdictional 
lines to facilitate efficient investigations, while providing a 
consistent level of minimum privacy protection in the state. 
4. Enforcement Mechanisms 
To ensure that departments abide by these minimal 
regulations, I propose a combination of enforcement 
mechanisms. The judicial and legislative branches have 
previously used these three enforcement mechanisms in other 
contexts to regulate police misconduct. By permitting a wide 
range of enforcement mechanisms, the statute attempts to 
avoid the traditional problems associated with police and 
organizational regulation. The first enforcement mechanism 
involves evidentiary exclusion. 
§7 Evidentiary Exclusion 
All evidence acquired by law enforcement in violation of 
this statute shall be inadmissible in state criminal 
courts. 
The judiciary generally excludes evidence obtained in 
violation of the constitution. This mechanism is “by far the 
most commonly used means of discouraging police misconduct 
and perhaps the most successful.” 344  Empirical evidence 
suggests that evidentiary exclusion can change law 
enforcement behavior and incentivize compliance with the 
law. 345  But the exclusionary rule suffers from several 
limitations. As Rachel Harmon has explained, the exclusionary 
rule is “riddled with exceptions and limitations, many of which 
are inconsistent with using the exclusionary rule as an 
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effective deterrent of police misconduct.” 346  Thus, if the 
misconduct happens to fall into one of these many exceptions, 
the exclusionary rule may not be an effective deterrent. But 
perhaps more importantly, as Harmon explains, “the scope of 
the exclusionary rule is inevitably much narrower than the 
scope of illegal police misconduct.”347 After all, the exclusionary 
rule would only work as a mechanism for preventing police 
misuse of digitally efficient databases if the police intended to 
use the resulting evidence in a criminal trial. But much of the 
misconduct I discuss in this article and previous work involves 
police utilizing retained data for undetermined secondary 
purposes. The exclusionary rule may do little to prevent this 
type of misconduct. To remedy this problem, I propose two 
other enforcement mechanisms. 
§8 Attorney General Right of Action 
The Attorney General of this state shall have a civil right 
of action against any police department that engages in a 
pattern or practice of violating this statute. 
§9 State Audit of Departmental Policy 
The Attorney General of this state shall have the 
authority to periodically audit departmental policies to 
ensure compliance with this statute. The Attorney 
General will publicly post the results of this audit to 
bring attention to noncompliant departments. 
Two of the statutes currently in operation only classify 
the violation of data retention and access policies as a minor 
criminal act. 348  In theory, these laws could result in the 
prosecution of a police officer who fails to abide by their 
parameters. But as Harmon concludes, “prosecutions against 
police officers are too rare to deter misconduct.” 349  This is 
because juries tend to sympathize with defendant police 
officers, and the criminal prosecution of minor misconduct is 
rarely among the top priorities for over-worked prosecutors.350 
Consequently, I avoid establishing criminal liability for officers 
who violate this statute. Instead, I suggest that the state 
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attorney general office should take on a proactive role in 
ensuring compliance through suing noncompliant agencies and 
occasionally auditing departmental policies. 
The first alternative enforcement mechanism gives the 
state attorney general statutory authority to bring suit against 
departments that engage in a pattern of practice of violating 
this statute. This is similar to the statutory mandate given to 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) by 42 U.S.C. §14141.351 Police 
scholar Barbara Armacost has called §14141 “perhaps the most 
promising mechanism” for addressing organizational 
misconduct.352 The late Bill Stuntz even believed that §14141 may 
be “more significant, in the long run, than Mapp v. Ohio . . . which 
mandated the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.” 353  Pattern and practice litigation, as 
authorized in §14141, is unique because it permits the DOJ to 
bring federal suit against police departments that engage in 
systematic misconduct; in practice, the DOJ successfully 
ensured the appointment of judicial monitors in targeted cities 
to oversee organizational and policy reform.354 Although there is 
only a small amount of empirical research on the effectiveness of 
§14141 in reducing police misconduct, the available evidence 
suggests it is one of the most effective means of bringing about 
organizational change.355 One of the only potential pitfalls of this 
form of regulation is that the state attorney general may have 
limited resources. 356  If resource constraints make lawsuits 
unlikely for noncompliant departments, a police agency might 
rationally calculate that the benefits of noncompliance outweigh 
the potential costs of litigation.357 
To remedy the concern over resource limitations, I 
propose that the state attorney general have statutory 
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authority to audit police departments. This would expand the 
regulatory reach of the statute while also harnessing the power 
of public opinion to force police compliance. This would also 
guarantee regular interaction between the attorney general 
and local departments, allowing the attorney general to check 
up on data practices. Rather than facing only the remote 
possibility of a pattern or practice lawsuit, departments would be 
faced with regular, random audits of their data policies. Because 
the results of this regular audit system would be posted online, 
the departments would also be publicly accountable if they fail to 
abide by the statute. This could incentivize administrators to 
follow state law for fear of public embarrassment that could 
threaten their job security. Rachel Harmon has suggested the 
DOJ utilize a similar policy to overcome resource limits and 
expand the potential impact of §14141.358 
In sum, these regulations attempt to holistically 
regulate the digitally efficient investigative state by limiting 
data retention and ensuring stored data are handled in a way 
that protects individual privacy, while still leaving ample room 
for legitimate law enforcement purposes. The enforcement 
mechanisms are sufficiently varied to ensure widespread 
compliance. And the statute as a whole follows the foundational 
principles of police surveillance regulations. The regulations are 
clear enough to avoid organizational mediation. They allow for 
individual variation. And they define the scope narrowly to only 
include a small subset of technologies like ALPR and 
surveillance cameras that pose a similar social risk. 
CONCLUSION 
The digitally efficient investigative state is here to stay. 
The empirical evidence clearly demonstrates that extremely 
efficient community surveillance technologies are an increasingly 
important part of American law enforcement. The language in 
Jones suggests that the judiciary may somehow limit public 
surveillance technologies in the future. To do so, the Court will 
have to confront the jurisprudential assumptions of police 
surveillance. That is no easy task. Much of the Court’s previous 
treatment of police surveillance has rested on the belief that 
individuals have no expectation of privacy in public places, and 
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that surveillance technologies that merely improve the efficiency 
of police investigations comport with the Fourth Amendment. 
At present, it remains unclear how and when the Court 
will begin to alter these important assumptions. The language 
in Jones offers little guidance. But even when the Court does 
eventually broach this subject, the judiciary’s institutional 
limitations will prevent it from crafting the type of expansive 
solution necessary to protect against the harms of the digitally 
efficient investigative state. In the absence of regulation, police 
departments across the country have developed dramatically 
different policies on the use of public surveillance technologies. 
Legislative bodies must take the lead and proactively limit the 
retention, identification, access, and sharing of personal data 
acquired by digitally efficient public surveillance technologies. 
The model state statute proposed in this Article would be a 
substantial step in reigning in the “unregulated efficiency of 
emerging investigative and surveillance technologies.”359 
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